Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences

Abstract

In everyday discourse and in the context of social scientific research we often attribute intentional states to groups. Contemporary approaches to group intentionality have either dismissed these attributions as metaphorical or provided an analysis of our attributions in terms of the intentional states of individuals in the group. Insection1, the author argues that these approaches are problematic. In sections 2 and 3, the author defends the view that certain groups are literally intentional agents. In section 4, the author argues that there are significant reasons for social scientists and philosophers of social science to acknowledge the adequacy of macro-level explanations that involve the attribution of intentional states to groups. In section 5, the author considers and responds to some criticisms of the thesis she defends.

The value of collective intentionality for understanding urban self-organization

“…For example, a neighborhood cleaning day is a rather isolated event that occurs at a neighborhood scale but it arises from the scale of individual awareness and intentionality that seeks collective operationalization. Collective intentionality can be extrapolated not only from the intrinsic characteristic of the individuals within a group, but also from the extrinsic properties of an intentional state (Tollefsen 2002). Whether or not the latter is an element of the existing socio-cultural or physical environment, psychological interpretations of social reality are crucial for developing an intentional entity, in determination of real-life actions.…”

Husserl on Collective Intentionality

“…16 For excellent overview articles, see Tollefsen 2004, Roth 2011and Schweikard/Schmid 2013 For a similar line of interpretation, see Caminada 2011, 68f. plaining the jointness of collective intentions with reference to already-collective intentional engagements, a charge that has typically been directed against 'collective acceptance' or 'joint commitment' accounts of CI (cf. Tollefsen 2002Tollefsen , 2004Schmid 2005;2009). Before lending support to this interpretation, however, we have to get an initial understanding of the most compelling alternatives currently at our disposal.…”

Methodological Individualism and Holism in Political Science: A Reconciliation

“…A reconciliation becomes possible once we see that there is not just one version of each view, but many, and that being an individualist in some respects is compatible with being a holist in others. Our proposal builds on ideas from the philosophy of mind (e.g., Putnam 1967;Fodor 1974;Stoljar 2009Stoljar , 2010Kim 1998Kim , 2005List and Menzies 2009) and the philosophy of social science (e.g., Macdonald and Pettit 1981;Kincaid 1986;Pettit 1993Pettit , 2003Tollefsen 2002;Sawyer 2002Sawyer , 2003List and Pettit 2011;Greve 2012), as well as the existing 3 debate in political science (e.g., Satz and Ferejohn 1994;Wendt 1999;Hay 2006;Peters 2012, ch. 1).…”