Collective Local Payments for ecosystem services: New local PES between groups, sanctions, and prior watershed trust in Mexico

Pfaff, Alexander; Rodríguez, L.; Shapiro‐Garza, Elizabeth

doi:10.1016/j.wre.2019.01.002

Cited by 35 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 78 publications

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“…These may lead to nonparticipants in agricultural non-point source pollution control gaining the same economic utility as participants. That is, rational agricultural producers will adopt the strategy of "free-riding", and thus the dilemma of agricultural non-point source pollution control will inevitably become the tragedy of commons [18,19]. So, establishing an endogenous mechanism to encourage local governments, new agricultural operators and traditional farmers to form a multi-agent co-governance model of agricultural non-point source pollution control is the key measure to break through the current dilemma.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China

Zhou

2020

IJERPH

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This paper focuses on the sustainable development dilemma of agricultural production in China under the pattern of intensive management, which is seriously challenged by agricultural non-point source pollution. The key to effectively break through the dilemma is to promote the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control by stakeholders including local governments, new agricultural operators and traditional farmers. Accordingly, this paper discusses the interactive decision-making relationships between new agricultural operators and traditional farmers under the guidance of local governments, by constructing a trilateral evolutionary game model, as well as analyzing evolutionary cooperative stability strategies and realizing the simulation of evolution processes in different scenarios by MATLAB. The results show that new agricultural operators play a leading role in agricultural non-point source pollution control, whose strategies have effects such as technology spillover. The rewards from the superior government will support local governments in taking proactive action in the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control, and then local governments can offer technical support and subsidies to new agricultural operators and traditional farmers for reducing their costs. Furthermore, this paper also finds that there are green synergy effects among the groups, where the variations of parameters and strategies by one group would affect the two others. Additionally, agricultural land operation rights transfers would cause traditional farmers to take more time to cooperate in the co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control. In order to promote the multi-agent co-governance of agricultural non-point source pollution control under intensive management pattern, this paper suggests that it should be necessary to reduce their costs and improve incentives, as well as to increase the common interests among groups and enhance their green synergy effects.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China

Zhou

2020

IJERPH

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“…Several international organizations, environmental non-profits, and governments have promoted the use of PHS programs worldwide with the assumption that they produce social benefits such as additional income to small landowners, poverty alleviation, and social capital, alongside environmental benefits [7,[39][40][41][42]. A review of the literature in PHS found that there are at least 387 PHS programs currently functioning worldwide [43].…”

Section: The Case: Stakeholder Participation In Payment For Hydrological Services (Phs) Program Decision Makingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Uncovering Stakeholder Participation in Payment for Hydrological Services (PHS) Program Decision Making in Mexico and Colombia

et al. 2021

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Payment for ecosystem services (PES) is a market-based policy approach intended to foster land use practices, such as forest conservation or restoration, that protect and improve the benefits from healthy, functioning ecosystems. While PES programs are used globally, they are an especially prominent environmental policy tool in Latin America, where the vast majority are payment for hydrological services (PHS) programs, which incentivize the conservation and restoration of ecosystems associated with water production and clean water for clearly defined water users. As a market mechanism, PHS approaches involve a transactional relationship between upstream and downstream water users who are connected by a shared watershed. While existing literature has highlighted the important role of non-state actors in natural resource management and program effectiveness, few studies have explored the role of stakeholder participation in the context of PHS programs. Building on the collaborative learning approach and the Trinity of Voice framework, we sought to understand how and to what extent PHS program stakeholders are engaged in PHS design, implementation, and evaluation. In this paper we explored (1) the modes of stakeholder engagement in PHS programs that program administrators use, and (2) the degree to which different modes of stakeholder participation allow PHS stakeholders to have decision power with which to influence PHS policy design and expected outcomes. To better understand the role of stakeholder participation, and the different ways participation occurs, we used a comparative multiple-case study analysis of three PHS program administration types (government, non-profit, and a mixed public–private organization) in Mexico and Colombia that have incorporated stakeholder engagement to achieve ecological and social goals. Our analysis draws on institutional interviews to investigate the modes of stakeholder engagement and understand the degree of decision space that is shared with other PHS stakeholders. Across all cases, we found that the trust between key actors and institutions is an essential but underappreciated aspect of successful collaboration within PHS initiatives. We conclude with recommendations for ways in which program administrators and governmental agencies can better understand and facilitate the development of trust in PHS design and implementation, and natural resources management more broadly.

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“…Therefore, if ecological service providers (or recipients) directly participate in watershed ecological compensation and accept (or pay) compensation according to their WTA (or willingness to pay), social and economic links will be established between the upstream and downstream of a river basin, resulting in an improved watershed ecological environment [15]. There is a vast literature on the willingness to pay of the direct stakeholders of river basins [19,20], but there are few studies on residents' WTA for watershed ecological conservation.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Determinants of Residents’ Willingness to Accept and Their Levels for Ecological Conservation in Ganjiang River Basin, China: An Empirical Analysis of Survey Data for 677 Households

et al. 2019

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Using the contingent valuation method and the Heckman two-stage model, we explore residents’ willingness to accept (WTA) compensation and their WTA level for ecological conservation compensation in the upstream of the Ganjiang River Basin in China. The findings reveal that 86.26% of the respondents are willing to accept compensation, and the average compensation level is ¥789.60/household per year. The residents’ gender, annual disposable income, residential location, decision on whether or not the watershed environment is important, and their satisfaction with water quality and quantity are significantly related to their WTA. The influencing factors that significantly affect compensation level are residents’ occupation, educational background, annual disposable income, family size, residential location, decision on whether or not the watershed environment is important, and their satisfaction with water quality and quantity. The results of this empirical research have important policy implications: the government should strengthen advocacy and education of watershed ecological environment protection, intensify farming and other agricultural activities, establish a differentiated and diversified compensation strategy, so as to protect and improve the ecological environment of the Ganjiang River Basin.

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Collective Local Payments for ecosystem services: New local PES between groups, sanctions, and prior watershed trust in Mexico

Cited by 35 publications

References 78 publications

An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China

An Evolutionary Game Model for the Multi-Agent Co-Governance of Agricultural Non-Point Source Pollution Control under Intensive Management Pattern in China

Uncovering Stakeholder Participation in Payment for Hydrological Services (PHS) Program Decision Making in Mexico and Colombia

Determinants of Residents’ Willingness to Accept and Their Levels for Ecological Conservation in Ganjiang River Basin, China: An Empirical Analysis of Survey Data for 677 Households

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