Collective rationality in interactive decisions: Evidence for team reasoning

Colman, Andrew M.; Pulford, Briony D.; Rose, Jo

doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2007.08.003

Cited by 90 publications

(75 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…The first published experiment explicitly designed to test team reasoning was reported by Colman, Pulford, and Rose (2008a), who presented subjects with five 3 × 3 commoninterest games, each of which had a unique Nash equilibrium and a different outcome that was payoff dominant over all other outcomes, including the Nash equilibrium. In all five games, a majority of players chose strategies aligned with the payoff-dominant, collectively rational outcome in preference to individually rational strategies mandated by the Nash equilibria.…”

Section: Experimental Evidence For Team Reasoningmentioning

confidence: 99%

Team reasoning: Solving the puzzle of coordination

Colman

Gold

2017

Psychon Bull Rev

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In many everyday activities, individuals have a common interest in coordinating their actions. Orthodox game theory cannot explain such intuitively obvious forms of coordination as the selection of an outcome that is best for all in a common-interest game. Theories of team reasoning provide a convincing solution by proposing that people are sometimes motivated to maximize the collective payoff of a group and that they adopt a distinctive mode of reasoning from preferences to decisions. This also offers a compelling explanation of cooperation in social dilemmas. A review of team reasoning and related theories suggests how team reasoning could be incorporated into psychological theories of group identification and social value orientation theory to provide a deeper understanding of these phenomena.Keywords Common knowledge . Cooperation . Coordination . Game theory . Group identification . Social dilemma . Social value orientation . Team reasoning Near the end of the 1960 movie Spartacus, directed by Stanley Kubrick, a Roman general addresses a group of slaves who have been captured after rising up in revolt, offering to spare them and return them to slavery if they identify their leader, Spartacus. To save his comrades, Spartacus (played by Kirk Douglas) rises to his feet and declares: BI am Spartacus.^Immediately and without any discussion among themselves, the other slaves stand up one by one, also claiming BI am Spartacus,^thereby preventing the Roman general from singling out their leader or anyone else for special punishment. This is a dramatic example of coordination, one of the most fundamental processes of social interaction, manifested whenever two or more individuals try to align their actions with one another in order to achieve a common goal.Coordination is an elementary form of cooperation, relatively neglected by researchers, perhaps partly because it is so familiar and commonplace, but it is beginning to attract attention (e.g., Thomas, Scioli, Haque, & Pinker, 2014). Surprisingly, because it seems so simple and obvious, it turns out to be inexplicable by orthodox game theory, a highly developed theory designed precisely to explain interactive decision making. Coordination thus appears to be a classic example of the type of phenomenon referred to by Heider (1958), in which Bthe veil of obviousness that makes so many insights of intuitive psychology invisible to our scientific eye has to be pierced( p. 7). In this article, we show how theories of team reasoning solve this problem convincingly and also provide a compelling explanation for cooperation in social dilemmas. We review the literature on team reasoning, including theoretical issues and experimental evidence, and, for the sake of balance and completeness, we discuss more briefly the principal competing theories of coordination and related theories of social psychology. We show how certain psychological theories could be strengthened significantly by incorporating team reasoning. Before going into details about these issues, it is ne...

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Section: Experimental Evidence For Team Reasoningmentioning

confidence: 99%

Team reasoning: Solving the puzzle of coordination

Colman

Gold

2017

Psychon Bull Rev

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“…Player i would anticipate this reply, refuting i's initial assumption that the probability of H j was 1/2 and undermining the basis of i's argument for choosing H i . The same reductio proof works against any argument based on assigning subjective probabilities to j's strategies (Colman, 2003;Colman, Pulford, & Rose, 2008).…”

Section: Footnotesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Standard individual reasoning is subsumed within team reasoning as a special case in which the team is a singleton. There is evidence from experimental games that team reasoning occurs quite frequently in practice (Colman, Pulford, & Rose, 2008).…”

Section: Berge Equilibrium Coordination and Payoff Dominancementioning

confidence: 99%

Mutual support in games: Some properties of Berge equilibria

Colman

Körner²,

Musy

et al. 2011

Journal of Mathematical Psychology

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The Berge equilibrium concept formalizes mutual support among players motivated by the altruistic social value orientation in games. We prove some basic results for Berge equilibria and their relations to Nash equilibria, and we provide a straightforward method for finding Berge equilibria in n-player games. We explore some specific examples, and we explain how the Berge equilibrium provides a compelling model of cooperation in social dilemmas. We show that the Berge equilibrium also explains coordination in some common interest games and is partially successful in explaining the payoff dominance phenomenon, and we comment that the theory of team reasoning provides alternative solutions to these problems.

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“…Bardsley and Ule (2017) report data that are more consistent with TR, though Crawford et al (2008) and Faillo et al (2017) In addition to coordination games, TR may also offer an explanation of collective behaviours in games where the interests of the players are not perfectly aligned. Various experiments indeed suggest that TR may explain cooperative behaviours in social dilemmas (Colman et al 2008, Guala et al 2009, Butler 2012, the traveller's dilemma (Becchetti et al 2009), or Centipede games (Pulford et al 2017). This means that we need a theory to determine more precisely the objective of the team, which is relatively trivial only in coordination games, when the interests of the players are identical.…”

Section: A Brief Literature Review and Open Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

What does “we” want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours

Lecouteux

2018

Revue d'Économie Politique

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cet éditorial présente les principales contributions de la théorie du raisonnement en équipe en théorie des jeux, et les problèmes qu’il reste à résoudre avant que cette théorie ne puisse offrir une alternative crédible à la théorie des jeux « orthodoxe ». Je suggère en particulier qu’une approche fondée sur l’agence collective plutôt la théorie du choix rationnel et les préférences sociales offre une théorie scientifiquement préférable des comportements collectifs, en termes de parcimonie et de validation empirique. Je propose une brève revue de la littérature économique portant sur le raisonnement en équipe, et met en avant les contributions des articles de ce numéro.

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Collective rationality in interactive decisions: Evidence for team reasoning

Cited by 90 publications

References 41 publications

Team reasoning: Solving the puzzle of coordination

Team reasoning: Solving the puzzle of coordination

Mutual support in games: Some properties of Berge equilibria

What does “we” want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours

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