Collective redress in labour and social law disputes: An (attractive) option for the EU?

Rasnača, Zane

doi:10.1177/20319525211056604

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…In the legal literature, such “substantive” judicial review has received mixed responses. While some see the CJEU as “over‐constitutionalizing” EU politics (Grimm 2017; Schmidt 2018), others observe a “constitutional dialogue” (Rasnača 2017) in which the purpose of substantive review is not to reject EU policies but rather to send them back to the political realm (so that substantive principles such as the respect for fundamental rights or equality between states can be better integrated in future policymaking). While the critique of “over‐constitutionalization” rests on the difficulties, in a complex legislative process, of constructing political responses to CJEU rulings – ironically it is the ECB's independence that makes this argument less compelling in EMU.…”

Section: Toward Substantive Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Accountability in the EU's para‐regulatory state: The case of the Economic and Monetary Union

Dawson

Maricut-Akbik

2021

Regulation & Governance

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This article revisits Majone's famous argument about accountability in the regulatory state in reference to the European Union's (EU) Economic and Monetary Union. We show that the EU has entered the stage of a “para‐regulatory state” marked by increasing EU regulation in areas linked to core state powers. Despite the redistributive and politicized nature of these policy areas, the EU's “para‐regulatory state” has continued to rely on its regulatory model of accountability, focused on decisionmaking processes, and interest mediation. In line with Majone, we describe the model as procedural and contrast it to substantive accountability – which is necessary when regulation has clear redistributive implications. Using two case studies from fiscal policy and monetary affairs, we illustrate the predominance of procedural accountability as exercised by the European Parliament and EU Courts. We complement the empirical analysis with a normative discussion of how substantive accountability could potentially be rendered in both fields.

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Section: Toward Substantive Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%