Collective Remittances and the State: The 3×1 Program in Mexican Municipalities

Abstract

The Mexican 3x1 Program for Migrants is a matching fund scheme that seeks to direct the money sent by hometown associations abroad (collective remittances) to productive uses. The federal, state and municipal governments contribute to the program multiplying by three the contributions sent by migrants abroad. Using municipal level data on program participation for the period 2002-2006, we evaluate the program's capacity to target the poorest municipalities. Since migration has a nonlinear relationship with poverty and marginality, a program that unconditionally responds to project initiatives from migrant organizations is bound to be regressive due to self-selection bias. Indeed, poorer municipalities are less likely to participate and they also receive lower amounts and fewer projects than relatively richer localities. Moreover, we find evidence of a partisan bias: states and municipalities ruled by the PAN are significantly more likely to participate in the program, and electoral support for the PAN is associated with more funds or projects awarded. We argue that substantial changes should be implemented for the program to be a truly progressive poverty reduction tool.Please do not cite without authors' permission.

Financial remittances, trans-border conversations, and the state

“…Finally, remittances are also used to finance the provision of local public goods such as clean water, sewage systems, paving, electricity, and other local infrastructure. There is abundant evidence that remittances, either in the form of collective remittances sent by hometown associations (HTAs) or individual remittances, improve local and social infrastructure in the recipient communities (Aparicio & Meseguer, 2012;Burgess, 2005;Iskander, 2010;Orozco, 2003). For instance, Duquette (2014) finds that co-production schemes such as the Three for One program in Mexico improved citizens' access to public sanitation, sewage, and water.…”

International Migration and Home Country Politics

“…2 This influence may include lobbying home governments, financing homeland elections (Nyblade and O'Mahony, this volume), or getting involved in local community development through public goods provision (Adida and Girod 2011;Aparicio and Meseguer 2012;Meseguer and Aparicio 2012;Duquette, this volume). In some cases, these activities may crowd out domestic claims to representation, embolden leaders or policies that perpetuate corrupt and/or exclusionary practices, or exacerbate ethnic, religious, or partisan cleavages.…”

“…In particular, when partnerships involve municipal or superior levels of government, the assignment of public goods suffers from political biases and is the object of political manipulation, too. In two recent articles, Aparicio and Meseguer (2012) and Meseguer and Aparicio (2012) show that public goods allocation under the Mexican Three for One Program (a paradigmatic and emblematic case of a public-private partnership involving HTAs) followed patterns that favored the strongholds of the ruling National Action Party (PAN) in states and municipalities of this party label. Therefore, although homelands may be better off thanks to the active involvement of migrants (Duquette, this volume), their impact on better accountability is not unconditional (Burgess 2011).…”

“…The author asks a straightforward question: does co-production of public works by migrants and public agencies improve citizens' access to social welfare? In particular, Duquette looks into the provision of several public goods and poverty reduction under the Three-for-One Program, a matching grant scheme whereby municipal, state, and federal administrations multiply by three the collective remittances that migrant clubs abroad send to their communities (Burgess 2005;Fernández de Castro et al 2006;Iskander 2010;Aparicio and Meseguer 2012;Meseguer and Aparicio, 2012). This program was born in the state of Zacatecas in the 1980s and became federal in 2002.…”

The Drivers of Diaspora Donations for Development: Evidence from the Philippines

“…Exceptions include Beauchemin and Schoumaker (2009) and Kiyima and Gonzales-Ramirez (2012) who show that migrant donations can foster local development in Burkina Faso and Mexico. Aparicio and Meseguer (2012) investigate the municipality-level determinants of the utilization of the 3-for-1 program in Mexico. They find that the program does not reach poorer municipalities and is politically biased.…”