Collective Responsibility Gaps

Collins, Stéphanie

doi:10.1007/s10551-018-3890-6

Cited by 23 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…In the framework for normative responsibility in team decision-making (de Leede et al, 1999) groups are considered cognitive systems that process incoming information in order to make collective choices for which they are responsible. Moreover, the literature on collective responsibility gaps (Collins, 2019) builds on an information processing framework to argue that because decision-making groups collectively process incoming information and engage in moral reasoning, they have moral agency and as such are responsible decision makers (groups as moral agents). Therefore, when trying to understand the way in which groups deal with moral dilemmas, we need to focus on the factors that influence collective information processing in groups.…”

Section: Moral Dilemmas and Group Rationalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This lack of empirical studies on how groups deal with moral dilemmas is also surprising given the fact that the agency and accountability of groups as decision makers is well-established in the business ethics literature (Beu, Buckley, & Harvey, 2003;Collins, 2019;de Leede, Nijhof, & Fisscher, 1999;Hunt & Jennings, 1997). In their framework for normative responsibility in team decision-making, de Leede and colleagues (1999) state that due to the emergence of group cognition (labeled as collective mind), groups are responsible decision makers in organizations.…”

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confidence: 99%

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“Me” versus “We” in moral dilemmas: Group composition and social influence effects on group utilitarianism

Curşeu

Fodor

Pavelea

et al. 2020

Business Ethics: A Eur Rev

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The paper is one of the first empirical attempts that builds on the moral dilemmas and group rationality literature to explore the way in which group composition with respect to group members’ individual choices in moral dilemmas and social influence processes impact on group moral choices. First individually and then, in small groups, 221 participants were asked to decide on 10 moral dilemmas. Our results show that emergent group level utilitarianism is higher than the average individual utilitarianism, yet, lower than the highest individual utilitarianism within groups. We also show that average individual utilitarianism positively predicts group utilitarianism while group fragmentation in individual utilitarianism has a negative effect on group utilitarianism. Next to group composition, minority influence processes explain additional variance in group utilitarianism, cognitive dissent having a positive influence, while normative deviance a negative influence on group utilitarianism. Majority influence has no significant influence on group utilitarianism. Finally, our results show that the relationship between group fragmentation in individual utilitarianism and emergent group utilitarianism is mediated by the two forms of minority influence.

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Section: Moral Dilemmas and Group Rationalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“Me” versus “We” in moral dilemmas: Group composition and social influence effects on group utilitarianism

Curşeu

Fodor

Pavelea

et al. 2020

Business Ethics: A Eur Rev

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“…The non-agential collective did not (and cannot) have a collective obligation, because it is not a collective moral agent. Therefore, it cannot be collectively responsible (see also Collins, 2019a, p. 951; Lawford-Smith, 2015, p. 241).…”

Section: The Intuitiveness and Relevance Of Type-symmetrymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…22). In Collins (2019a, p. 951), Type-Symmetry is discussed, but no definite position is taken by Collins, see fn. 8.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Relation Between Collective Responsibility and Collective Duties

Haan¹

2020

Philosophy

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There is good reason to think that moral responsibility as accountability is tied to the violation of moral demands. This lends intuitive support to Type-Symmetry in the collective realm: A type of responsibility entails the violation or unfulfillment of the same type of all-things-considered duty. For example, collective responsibility necessarily entails the violation of a collective duty. But Type-Symmetry is false. In this paper I argue that a non-agential group can be collectively responsible without thereby violating a collective duty. To show this I distinguish between four types of responsibility and duty in collective contexts: corporate, distributed, collective, shared. I set out two cases: one involves a non-reductive collective action that constitutes irreducible wrongdoing, the other involves a non-divisible consequence. I show that the violation of individual or shared duties both can lead to irreducible wrongdoing for which only the group is responsible. Finally, I explain why this conclusion does not upset any work on individual responsibility.

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“…List and Pettit 2011; French 1984; Rovane 1998). And (ii) is more controversial again: it's natural to assume that a truly 'holistic' and 'non-reductive' property of a group would lack implications about the correlative property in the group's constituents, and other authors have argued that a group can hold backward-looking responsibility without any individual holding backward-looking responsibility, leading to so-called 'responsibility gaps' (Collins 2019b). But collectives' duties entail members' duties-or so Group Duties argues, by rejecting a number of purported counterexamples to that implication.…”

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confidence: 99%