2020
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101859
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Collective vs. individual lobbying

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Cited by 9 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…However, despite the many shared barriers to change reported across the diverse stakeholders interviewed, there remains a lack of collaboration across numerous trade bodies representing industry sub-sectors. Trade bodies could become multi-stakeholder ‘bridging leaders’ 30 , 31 of change by aligning in their individual 32 efforts towards the shared vision (Table 1 and Fig. 4 ).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, despite the many shared barriers to change reported across the diverse stakeholders interviewed, there remains a lack of collaboration across numerous trade bodies representing industry sub-sectors. Trade bodies could become multi-stakeholder ‘bridging leaders’ 30 , 31 of change by aligning in their individual 32 efforts towards the shared vision (Table 1 and Fig. 4 ).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the literature on the analysis of the game between local governments and polluting firms, some studies have analyzed their regulation and rent-seeking, respectively, from the perspective of the Nash equilibrium under mixed strategies [ 4 ]. Others have analyzed the equilibrium outcomes of the firm–government game under different institutional arrangements [ 5 ], and some studies have analyzed how environmental regulation affects the direction of industry output equilibrium in the context of Cournot competition and oligopoly [ 6 ]. In the literature on environmental strategy games among local governments, some studies have analyzed rational government and inefficient environmental regulation from the perspective of the Pigou tax [ 7 ], whereas others have used evolutionary games to analyze the evolutionary paths and stabilization strategies of local governments in air pollution control [ 8 ].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%