2002
DOI: 10.1111/j.1759-5436.2002.tb00032.x
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Collectors, councillors and donors: Local government taxation and state-society relations in Tanzania

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Cited by 6 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…However, local authorities in developing countries often view taxation too narrowly, and conceive it as an extractive instrument of the state, rather than as a way to build permanent links between the state and its citizens. The works of Fjeldstad (2002) and Luoga (2002) on local taxation in Tanzania illustrate how taxpayers feel exploited and dissatisfied with service delivery when taxes are levied in an arbitrary and coercive manner. This undermines the legitimacy of local governments and increases tax resistance.…”
Section: Box 1: Tax Coercion and Voluntary Compliancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, local authorities in developing countries often view taxation too narrowly, and conceive it as an extractive instrument of the state, rather than as a way to build permanent links between the state and its citizens. The works of Fjeldstad (2002) and Luoga (2002) on local taxation in Tanzania illustrate how taxpayers feel exploited and dissatisfied with service delivery when taxes are levied in an arbitrary and coercive manner. This undermines the legitimacy of local governments and increases tax resistance.…”
Section: Box 1: Tax Coercion and Voluntary Compliancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…There have been decentralisation experiments in sub-Saharan Africa since the 1990s in the name of reform, which have received mixed reviews. Their characterisation brings up parameters of failure in some cases and of stagnation in others (Kassibo 2002;Fjeldstad 2002;Kasfir 1983 ;Oyugi 1983), mainly when applied to natural resources management (Bazaara 2003;Etoungou 2003 ;Lungusile 2003;Mapedza 2003). The following paper aims -from a political economy perspective and from the angle of ' democratic decentralisation' -to question the process of forest management decentralisation in Cameroon, described as the pioneering experiment in the whole Congo basin (Nguinguiri 1997), the world's second most important forest ecosystem after Amazonia.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…• Densité du maquis de la fiscalité locale : dans presque tous les cas, la participation aux marchés se solde par une forme ou une autre d'imposition (droits de transit, taxe de marché, taxes sur les produits, permis de circuler, taxes sur les bicyclettes), décourageant la participation à l'économie monétaire et réduisant le volume global des échanges (Fjeldstad, 2001(Fjeldstad, , 2002. • Multiplication des ponctions : la relation de prédation « informelle » entre le représentant de l'État et le citoyen peut comporter une multiplicité de redevances, d'amendes et d'interdictions (Freeman et autres, 2004).…”
Section: Encadré 142 Pourquoi Préfère-t-on La Mobilité Temporaire ?unclassified