Collusion By Blockchain And Smart Contracts

Schrepel, Thibault

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3315182

Cited by 20 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…The misleading nature of the decentralization theater is most likely caused by the fact that there is currently no clear-cut definition of what a "decentralized platform" is, no consensus over how decentralization should be understood in the context of blockchain, and a lack of agreement on what blockchain decentralization achieves or sets out to achieve. A case in point is "collusion by blockchains and smart contracts, " as reported by Cong and He (2019) and Schrepel (2019), whereby federated blockchains were construed to facilitate collusion through cartel-enabling smart contracts hampering deconcentration efforts of antitrust and competition agencies. de Filippi and Loveluck (2014) are equally cautious of recommending blockchains for decentralization purposes, observing that the conception of Bitcoin as a decentralized platform was compromised by its inability to protect itself from capitalist tendencies to concentrate power and wealth.…”

Section: Discussion -How Is Blockchain-mediated Decentralization Unique?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Toward a Formal Scholarly Understanding of Blockchain-Mediated Decentralization: A Systematic Review and a Framework

2020

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This work analyses blockchain-mediated decentralization based on a systematic review of the scholarly understanding of the term 'decentralization' across multiple disciplines from computer to political sciences, examining how its various meanings are reflected in popular discourse on blockchains and distributed ledgers. The paper aims to capture the rigorous cross-domain understanding of decentralization and its most important features, and to map the commonalities and differences between it and some closely related concepts such as distribution, disintermediation and peer-topeer (P2P). Across all domains, decentralization appears to be used as a solution to problems requiring non-trivial coordination across heterogeneous stakeholders. Blockchain-mediated decentralization appears to have unique characteristics reflecting an idiosyncratic set of authority-related values prevalent in so-called "crypto" online communities. Within blockchain space, the article argues against the binary positioning of "decentralization" and "centralization," proposing a dialectical approach and arguing that a system's authority allocation is a quality positioned on a spectrum between purely decentralized and completely centralized, noting how a blockchain setup could simultaneously both have facets that are significantly centralized and others that are not. The authors document their systematic review findings and propose a framework for understanding blockchain-mediated decentralization, suggesting a definition, and outlining new directions for further human-centric research into distributed ledger technologies and for designing decentralized ecosystems.

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Section: Discussion -How Is Blockchain-mediated Decentralization Unique?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Toward a Formal Scholarly Understanding of Blockchain-Mediated Decentralization: A Systematic Review and a Framework

2020

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“…Collusion on blockchains and collusions with the help of blockchains is also a vexing frontier for competition law scholars (Schrepel, 2019). Research exploring the various interactions of blockchain, DLT, DAO, AI, and machine learning (ML) etc.…”

Section: The Interrelationship Between Competition Law and Blockchainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Augmenting Blockchain With Competition Law for a Sustainable Economic Evolution

Yawar

Shaw

2022

Front. Blockchain

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Since its introduction, blockchain technology has been revered, ridiculed, dismissed, embraced, and presently has become too large to ignore, witnessing exponential growth. The obvious indicator of this growth is that research revolving around blockchain technology has already raised competition in the form of directed acyclic graphs and hashgraph, all of which fall under the umbrella of distributed ledger technology (DLT). Segueing on the back of visibly positive effects of competition, we arrive at the essence of our paper. We show that the current competition regimes around the world are inefficient at promoting and maintaining competition around the world, dominated by the behemoth technology enterprises that have successfully monopolized and monetized data, which is indubitably, one of the most important assets in today’s digital age. Data gathered from users fuels the algorithms, machine learning, and artificial intelligence programs employed by these tech giants, which further entrenches their monopolistic hold over cyberspace. Blockchain and DLTs, just like any other technology, pose new threats to the competition law regimes, while also allowing the authorities to utilize the technology themselves to explore new horizons involving smart contracts, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), Web 3.0, and enforce competition more effectively. In our paper, we briefly illustrate the challenges presented before the competition authorities by the assimilation of blockchain in the existing establishments, and how the competition authorities can themselves collude with blockchain stakeholders to take a holistic approach and establish a symbiotic relationship, which ensures that both, survive, prosper, and enhance consumer welfare.

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“…Antitrust risks are present with respect to the current studies' use of consortium blockchains such as Hyperledger (i.e., private blockchains run by a pre-selected group of institutions) for handling the cash flow data: the immutability, irreversibility, and guarantee of execution do not always hold in consortium blockchains (Buterin 2015) and depend heavily on group dynamics. Project stakeholders can have competing business objectives and are prone to collusions that can impair the soundness of the consensus algorithm (Schrepel 2019). Such risks are less present in public blockchains (Schrepel and Buterin 2020).…”

Section: Point Of Departurementioning

confidence: 99%