Collusive Practices in Repeated English Auctions: Experimental Evidence on Bidding Rings

Phillips, Owen R.; Menkhaus, Dale J.; Coatney, Kalyn T.

doi:10.1257/000282803322157205

Cited by 37 publications

(40 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Our choice to focus on strong cartels is also supported by experimental evidence. Phillips, Menkhaus and Coatney (2003) show that even groups of 6 bidders who interact repeatedly are able to form stable coalitions when communication is allowed. In their communication treatment, Hamaguchi, Ishikawa, Ishimoto, Kimura and Tanno (2007) …nd that in procurement auctions subjects do not cheat on the agreement reached in the communication phase.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…5 In contrast, there is a vast experimental literature on collusion in multi-unit auctions. This literature includes Goswami, Noe, and Rebello (1996), Shertsyuk (1999Shertsyuk ( , 2002, Kwasnica (2000), Levin (2001, 2005), Phillips, Menkhaus and Coatney (2003), Sade, Schnitzlein and Zender (2006), Kwasnica and Sherstyuk The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the theoretical background of our experiments.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Fighting collusion in auctions: An experimental investigation

Offerman

Onderstal

2011

International Journal of Industrial Organization

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The danger of collusion presents a serious challenge for auctioneers. In this paper, we compare the collusive properties of two standard auctions, the English auction and the …rst-price sealed-bid auction, and a lesser-known format, the Amsterdam (secondprice) auction. In the Amsterdam auction, the highest losing bidder earns a premium for stirring up the price. We study two settings: in one, all bidders can collude, and in another, only a subset is eligible. The experiments show that the Amsterdam auction triggers less collusion than the standard auctions. We compare experimental results to theoretical predictions, and provide an explanation where they di¤er.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fighting collusion in auctions: An experimental investigation

Offerman

Onderstal

2011

International Journal of Industrial Organization

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“…The only information revealed to the participants during the pre-auction communication phase was the types and numbers of auctioned goods. All three features facilitating collusion from Phillips et al (2003) were therefore satisfied.…”

Section: Communicationmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…All communication was monitored and recorded. This approach was already used in for example Phillips et al (2003). Miralles (2008).…”

Section: Communicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Collusion in Multi-Object Auctions: Experimental Evidence

Matoušek

Cingl

2017

Eastern European Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract: Terms of use: Documents inWe experimentally examine the attributes of two complex multi-unit auction mechanisms in the presence of an opportunity to collude among bidding participants due to a provision of a simple communication channel. The results suggest that the combinatorial bidding format does not bring higher efficiency. Allowing for communication increases efficiency in both examined auction formats. Bidders are able to split the auctioned goods in a cheap-talk collusive agreement, which results in a better allocation compared to the auction formats without the communication channel. Combinatorial bidding on packages makes the decision-making problem of bidders hard to process and cause inefficiencies, especially for designs with the large number of auctioned goods.

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Multiunit Auctions

Kwasnica

Sherstyuk

2013

A Collection of Surveys on Market Experiments

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We survey experimental research on multi-unit auctions with an emphasis on topics that may be of a unifying interest to experimental, as well as theoretical and empirical economists. Topics include static and dynamic multi-unit auctions; combinatorial auctions and efficient auction design; simultaneous and sequential auctions; bidder asymmetry and endogenous entry, and collusion in auctions. We also discuss behavioral regularities observed in multi-unit auction experiments.

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Collusive Practices in Repeated English Auctions: Experimental Evidence on Bidding Rings

Cited by 37 publications

References 18 publications

Fighting collusion in auctions: An experimental investigation

Fighting collusion in auctions: An experimental investigation

Collusion in Multi-Object Auctions: Experimental Evidence

Multiunit Auctions

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