Colombia, from failing state to a second independence: The politics and the price

Abstract

Amid social and political conditions that could well lead to Colombia being described in the terms of a failed state, the country’s electorate chose Álvaro Uribe as its thirty-ninth president in 2002, and again in 2006, preferring to keep in office a man who seemed to be putting the country together again, rather than respecting the constitutional prohibition against consecutive presidential terms. Though his presidency was marked by scandals and irregularities – most notably, the falsos positivos (false positives: young, poor Colombian civilians, assassinated in cold blood by the zealous armed forces and listed as guerrilla kills) – Uribe enjoyed approval ratings previously unknown in Colombian history. He is in fact credited with giving Colombia its ‘second independence’, and his leaving office was, for many, tragic. Here, I present an explanation for this paradox, analysing an aspect of Uribe’s discourse for the way it contributed to producing a shared national sentiment by articulating a social imaginary with limited possibilities for making sense of Colombia. Drawing on Geertz, Durkheim and Brubaker and the concepts of hegemony and identification, I elucidate the effectiveness of Uribe’s discourse of the nation in a context of a long experience of frustration and decadence, and show why and how so many Colombians could, at least for a time, give their overwhelming support to a regime wherein murder was authorized, unacknowledged as anything more significant than the price to be paid for that second independence.

Spectacular ‘nationism’ in modern Colombia: Mediating commitment to the military option

“…As has been noted by a number of analysts (Browitt, 2001;DeShazo et al, 2007;Lobo, 2009Lobo, , 2012McLean, 2002;Richani, 2007;Rotberg, 2003), Uribe assumed the presidency of a country teetering on the brink, with civil society in disarray, corruption rife in public and private institutions, and various bands of guerrillas, paramilitaries, and narco-traffickers fighting one another and the state. In an attempt to shore up support for this military offensive amid such centrifugal circumstances, in which sympathies for the national armed forces could not be taken for granted, the Revista Ejército (the Army Magazine or Army Journal) would later report, 'the Army sought out the most real way of sending a message that would directly reach the hearts of Colombians' (Ejército Nacional de Colombia, 2009) regarding the 'kindness' and the 'responsibility' of the soldiers on the front lines.…”

Colombia's Political Football: President Santos' National Unity Project and the 2014 Football World Cup

“…Pastrana's decision may have been ‘logical given that the FARC was the only group ever to have administered the territory’ (Hylton, : 99) but it also demoralised the nation. It was effectively an admission of state failure, and also legitimised the FARC as de facto regional controllers and as ‘legitimate political agents’ (Lobo, : 358). As paramilitaries were effectively controlling much of the Magdalena Medio region, Suárez suggests that Colombians worried that the political division of the country could change and give way to three different nations: the Colombian Republic, the Republic of Caguán, and the Republic of the Medio Magdalena (Suárez, : 413).…”

“…He sought also to strengthen the state, particularly the military and security institutions, and to reinvent patriotic symbols. As Lobo establishes, Uribe's ‘discourse produced a clear line of demarcation between us – the nation – and them – the nation's enemies’ (Lobo, : 355). With this single‐minded anti‐insurgent policy, and through the regeneration of national symbols and icons, he managed to ‘rekindle the idea of a nation as one, rather than as many.…”

“…Since being elected in 2010, Santos has changed political tack, returning to a discourse of social conflict in Colombia which allows the guerrillas some degree of legitimacy as political actors (Lobo, : 362). Peace negotiations continue with FARC, but examples of how Santos includes guerrillas (and those in their territories) as equally Colombian can be appreciated through his statements around football.…”

Periodismo de paz: ¿La panacea para la Colombia del posconflicto?

“…This forums aim to "create a space for reflection, exchange of experiences, dialogue and collective construction to identify issues and challenges in communication and culture for the post-conflict." 30 At the same time, the special Unit for Restitution of Dispossessed Land, which is an entity under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, has organized several meetings in different cities to raise awareness among journalists about their complex role when reporting about land restitution to victims of the conflict: "As we get more clarity on how the Unit for Land Restitutions is working, we can focus better our news. Hopefully this training will continue, as it still exists -especially in terms of media -much ignorance about The High Commissioner for Peace, Sergio Jaramillo, invited journalists and opinion leaders to think about the role of the media in building peace and national reconciliation.…”