Color revolutions: The Belarus case

Abstract

This paper focuses on the 2006 presidential elections in Belarus and offers several explanations for the lack of regime change. It posits that the answers lie in the official interpretations of the historical past, the personal popularity of the president—acquired partly through his firm control over the media and persecution of his enemies—and the electorate’s focus on economic rather than political issues or emphasis on democratic values. It notes also the importance of Russia as a player in Belarus, and Russia’s ambivalent attitude toward the continuing dictatorship in Minsk.

More than Just the Final Straw: Stolen Elections as Revolutionary Triggers

“…Rather than seeing the failure of postelectoral protests in Georgia's and Ukraine's neighbors as proof that stolen elections were not of overriding importance, it is more plausible to argue that the difference between stolen elections and electoral fraud that falls short of this category is a key explanation of these varying outcomes. 43 Other cases (such as Kenya in 1997 and Zimbabwe in 2002) that may possibly be invoked to question the significance of stolen elections also fall short in the sense of the term used here. 44 There is one clear-cut example of a stolen election that did not lead to the overthrow of an electoral authoritarian regime, and interestingly it occurred in one of the cases considered initially-Serbia.…”

Public space in the Soviet city: A spatial perspective on mass protests in Minsk

“…David Marples (2006) points out that Belarus in 2006 was lacking every single of McFaul's (2005) conditions (see above), arguing that the president had a firm grip on the official ideology, and had been able to maintain his popularity in large segments of the population through his control over media, through his repressions of political opponents, and by maintaining close relations to Russia (Marples 2006). To this, Barbara Törnquist-Plewa (2001) adds the (most) successful Russification under the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, and a weak Belarusian identity.…”

The Neo-Communist Regime of Present-Day China

“…This ageing, conservative electorate is very receptive to the neo-communists' depiction of Belarus as an oasis of economic stability. Due to Russian subsidies, the population has generally been protected from dramatic changes, shock therapy, the presence of oligarchs, mass privatization, and high prices for amenities such as housing, heating, and food ( [41]: 352-3, 362). Serious socio-economic crises in other CIS republics as well as limited and distorted information provided by state controlled media further increase their fear of change.…”