Combinatorial Auctions in Practice

Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio; Parkes, David C.; Steinberg, Richard

doi:10.1257/jel.20221679

Journal of Economic Literature

2024

DOI: 10.1257/jel.20221679

|View full text |Cite

Combinatorial Auctions in Practice

Ignacio Palacios-Huerta,

David C. Parkes,

Richard Steinberg

Abstract: We survey the uses of combinatorial auctions that have been deployed in practice, giving emphasis to their key representational and economic aspects. In addition, we discuss behavioral economics considerations on both the bidder and auctioneer sides of the market, and the interrelated topics of simplicity and trust, highlighting key opportunities for future work. (JEL D44, D91)

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Citation Types

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Year Published

2024

Publication Types

Select...

Article2

Relationship

Self Cite0

Independent2

Authors

Journals

Cited by 2 publications

References 136 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

An iterative price-based combinatorial double auction for additive manufacturing markets

De Antón,

Villafáñez,

Poza

et al. 2024

Computers & Industrial Engineering

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

An iterative price-based combinatorial double auction for additive manufacturing markets

De Antón,

Villafáñez,

Poza

et al. 2024

Computers & Industrial Engineering

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

An Iterative Procurement Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for the Multi-Item, Multi-Sourcing Supplier-Selection and Order-Allocation Problem under a Flexible Bidding Language and Price-Sensitive Demand

Abbaas,

Ventura

2024

Mathematics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study addresses the multi-item, multi-sourcing supplier-selection and order-allocation problem. We propose an iterative procurement combinatorial auction mechanism that aims to reveal the suppliers’ minimum acceptable selling prices and assign orders optimally. Suppliers use a flexible bidding language to submit procurement bids. The buyer solves a Mixed Integer Non-linear Programming (MINLP) model to determine the winning bids for the current auction iteration. We introduce a buyer’s profit-improvement factor that constrains the suppliers to reduce their selling prices in subsequent bids. Moreover, this factor enables the buyer to strike a balance between computational effort and optimality gap. We develop a separate MINLP model for updating the suppliers’ bids while satisfying the buyer’s profit-improvement constraint. If none of the suppliers can find a feasible solution, the buyer reduces the profit-improvement factor until a pre-determined threshold is reached. A randomly generated numerical example is used to illustrate the proposed mechanism. In this example, the buyer’s profit improved by as much as 118% compared to a single-round auction. The experimental results show that the proposed mechanism is most effective in competitive environments with several suppliers and comparable costs. These results reinforce the importance of fostering competition and diversification in a supply chain.

show abstract

scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.

Contact Info

customersupport@researchsolutions.com

10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614

Henderson, NV 89052, USA

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.

Blog Terms and Conditions API Terms Privacy Policy Contact Cookie Preferences Do Not Sell or Share My Personal Information

Made with 💙 for researchers

Part of the Research Solutions Family.

Combinatorial Auctions in Practice

Cited by 2 publications

References 136 publications

An iterative price-based combinatorial double auction for additive manufacturing markets

An iterative price-based combinatorial double auction for additive manufacturing markets

An Iterative Procurement Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for the Multi-Item, Multi-Sourcing Supplier-Selection and Order-Allocation Problem under a Flexible Bidding Language and Price-Sensitive Demand

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About