Combining Federalism with Consociationalism: Is Belgian Consociational Federalism Digging its Own Grave?

Abstract

Belgian consociational federalism is often praised for its ability to deal peacefully with the country's internal divisions. Nevertheless, recent political stalemates raise the question: Is Belgian consociational federalism digging its own grave? This article argues that granting segmental autonomy effectively accommodates political conflicts that are currently on the agenda, but renders the process of intersegmental conflict accommodation increasingly more difficult in the long run. More specifically, federalism undermines the problem-solving capacity of the other power-sharing mechanisms in three ways: (1) it increases demands for more autonomy, (2) it decreases the potential for package deals and (3) it lowers the costs of nonagreements which induce a political stalemate. These evolutions are often overlooked, but go to the heart of the impasse Belgian politics has recently experienced.Belgium is generally considered to be a deeply divided society, a polity characterized by deep mutually reinforcing cleavages. Economic, cultural, social and political struggles are often reduced to a political competition between the different segments of society, and this situation is often considered detrimental to democratic stability. Yet, Belgium is also a polity that is often praised for its ability to settle its internal tensions and divisions peacefully. Like many other democratic regimes faced with deep societal divisions, it has adopted rules that are more demanding than simple majorities; these institutions force the conflicting groups to get together, and find solutions that every segment can endorse. And hitherto, these institutions seem to be working well, as they have always

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