Combining system-theoretic process analysis and availability assessment: A subsea case study

Zhang, Juntao; Kim, Hyung-Ju; Liu, Yiliu; Lundteigen, Mary Ann

doi:10.1177/1748006x18822224

Cited by 10 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…A hazard analysis made through STPA become the foundation of this study. An extension of STPA is also provided in [43] where it is proposed a new approach named STPA-RAM (Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability). This latter consists in the utilization of a discrete event simulation to transform the feedback control loops into a set of stochastic Petri nets.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Thinking in Systems, Sifting Through Simulations: A Way Ahead for Cyber Resilience Assessment

et al. 2023

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The interaction between the physical world and information technologies creates advantages and novel emerging threats. Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) result vulnerable to cyber-related disruptive scenarios, and, for some critical systems, cyber failures may have fallouts on society and environment. Traditional risk analysis in no more sufficient to deal with these problems. New techniques are gaining increasing consensus, especially those based on systems theory. In this context, the System-Theoretic Process Analysis for Security (STPA-Sec) extends the Systems-Theoretic Accident Modelling and Processes (STAMP) model considering cyber threats, and identifying unsafe and unsecure controls throughout a cyber socio-technical system. Despite its large usage as a descriptive tool, there is still limited use of STPA-Sec in (semi-)quantitative terms. This article presents System-Theoretic Process Analysis for Security with Simulations (STPA-Sec/S), a methodological interface between STPA-Sec and quantitative resilience assessment based on simulation models. The methodology is instantiated in a demonstrative case study of a water treatment plant, and its critical CPSs which may impact both community health, and environment. The obtained results show how STPA-Sec/S foster systems understanding, allow a systematic identification of its major criticalities, and the respective quantification.INDEX TERMS Cyber security, cyber-socio-technical systems, hazard analysis, industrial systems engineering, resilience management, systems modeling.Open Access funding provided by 'Università degli Studi di Roma ''La Sapienza''' within the CRUI CARE Agreement

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Thinking in Systems, Sifting Through Simulations: A Way Ahead for Cyber Resilience Assessment

et al. 2023

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“…It is among the most regulated industries with many comprehensive standards regarding safety at sea, security, health and protection of crew members, and environmental safeguarding [27], also due to the attraction that naval incidents have on media and reputational risks [28]. In these settings, CAST provided a more systematic and comprehensive perspective on accident analysis, helping to discover more problems and defects at different levels in a grounding accident cruise [29]. Specific recommendations have been instructed through CAST, related to blackout, loss of propulsion and near grounding situations in stormy water [28].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Learning from Incidents in Socio-Technical Systems: A Systems-Theoretic Analysis in the Railway Sector

et al. 2022

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Post mortem incident investigations are vital to prevent the occurrence of similar events and improve system safety. The increasing interactions of technical, human and organizational elements in modern systems pose new challenges for safety management, demanding approaches capable of complementing techno-centric investigations with social-oriented analyses. Hence, traditional risk analysis methods rooted in event-chain reactions and looking for individual points of failure are increasingly inadequate to deal with system-wide investigations. They normally focus on an oversimplified analysis of how work was expected to be conducted, rather than exploring what exactly occurred among the involved agents. Therefore, a detailed analysis of incidents beyond the immediate failures extending towards socio-technical threats is necessary. This study adopts the system-theoretic accident model and process (STAMP) and its nested accident analysis technique, i.e., causal analysis based on systems theory (CAST), to propose a causal incident analysis in the railway industry. The study proposes a hierarchical safety control structure, along with system-level safety constraints, and detailed investigations of the system’s components with the purpose of identifying physical and organizational safety requirements and safety recommendations. The analysis is contextualized in the demonstrative use of a railway case. In particular, the analysis is instantiated for a 2011 incident in the United Kingdom (UK) railway system. Hence, the CAST technique requires information regarding incidents, facts and processes. Therefore, the case study under analysis provided the information to analyze the accidents based on system theory, in which the results of the analysis prove the benefits of a CAST application to highlight criticalities at both element- and system-level, spanning from component failure to organizational and maintenance planning, enhancing safety performance in normal work practices.

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“…it explicitly excludes likelihood), which limits its utility in decision-making and makes it not fully compatible with risk-based standards. 7,28,29 Theme: Incorporate Uncertainty STPA is not quantitative and does not consider epistemic uncertainty in the causal model. 30,31 Theme: Scenario-based Analysis STPA does not define any framework for an operational scenario-based analysis, although it could be adapted to be used in such an analysis…”

Section: Stamp/stpa Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Toward a hybrid causal framework for autonomous vehicle safety analysis

Thomas

Groth

2021

Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part O:

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Autonomous Vehicles (AVs), also known as self-driving cars, are a potentially transformative technology, but developing and demonstrating AV safety remains an open question. AVs offer some unique challenges that stretch the limits of traditional safety engineering practices. Most current safety standards and methodologies in the AV industry were not originally intended for application to autonomous vehicles, and they have significant limitations and shortcomings. In this article, we analyze the literature to first build an argument that a new safety framework is needed for AVs. We then use the identified limitations of current methodologies as a basis to formulate a set of fundamental requirements that must be met by any proposed AV safety framework. We propose a new AV safety framework based on the Hybrid Causal Logic (HCL) methodology, which combines Event Sequence Diagrams (ESDs), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), and Bayesian Networks (BNs). The HCL framework is developed at a conceptual level and then evaluated versus the identified fundamental requirements. To further illustrate how the framework may meet the requirements, a simple example of an AV perception system scenario is developed using the HCL framework and evaluated. The results demonstrate that the HCL framework provides an integrated approach that has the potential to satisfy more completely the fundamental requirements than the current methodologies.

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Combining system-theoretic process analysis and availability assessment: A subsea case study

Cited by 10 publications

References 29 publications

Thinking in Systems, Sifting Through Simulations: A Way Ahead for Cyber Resilience Assessment

Thinking in Systems, Sifting Through Simulations: A Way Ahead for Cyber Resilience Assessment

Learning from Incidents in Socio-Technical Systems: A Systems-Theoretic Analysis in the Railway Sector

Toward a hybrid causal framework for autonomous vehicle safety analysis

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