Come rain, or come wells: How access to groundwater affects communal violence

Abstract

This paper empirically analyzes the relationship between groundwater scarcity and incidences of communal violence. Case studies suggest that appropriating water is more likely when resource scarcities are not effectively mitigated and where property rights are disputed. Yet, covering water more broadly remains piecemeal in quantitative research on communal conflict. While water scarcity features in large-N literature on climate variability and non-state conflicts, such studies rely heavily on rainfall data which covers only one aspect of the hydrological cycle. Employing precipitation data alone neglects the use of groundwater, an important factor for drought resilience and the source for 50% of global drinking water. While rainfall remains key for agriculture, pastoralists and small-scale farmers in particular rely on groundwater as a buffer during dry periods. Thus, analyses on water scarcity and conflict ought to combine measures for groundwater, surface water, and precipitation. While controlling for other sources of water, the lack of groundwater access is hypothesized to increase incidences of violent communal conflict. The effect of groundwater on communal violence is also argued to vary with the presence of drought, low rainfall, in densely populated areas, and with state presence. These propositions are tested through large-N analyses using previously not utilized data on water availability with incidence data on violent conflict for Africa and the Middle East (1990-2014). The results show that lacking access to groundwater is associated with a higher risk of communal violence. Further, the effect of groundwater access on communal violence is conditioned by precipitation levels as well as population density. The results also suggest that the effect of groundwater on violence is smaller in areas with higher state presence.

Food and water insecurity as causes of social unrest: Evidence from geolocated Twitter data

“…One strain of research examines how water insecurity impacts international war and cooperation (Koubi et al, 2014; Mitchell & Zawahri, 2015), while other studies analyze some of its impacts on civil conflict (Selby & Hoffmann, 2014; Döring, 2020). For example, Döring (2020) recently analyzed the impact of access to groundwater on communal conflicts in Africa and the Middle East, and found that in these contexts water insecurity increases the risk of communal conflict. Water insecurity’s impact on social unrest, however, remains surprisingly less studied.…”

“…Like food insecurity, water insecurity can be caused by natural factors (e.g. droughts, heatwaves), human behaviors (misappropriation or contamination of water resources), and population dynamics (Bakker, 2012; Hoekstra, Buurman & van Ginkel, 2018; Döring, 2020). Bakker (2012), for instance, identifies four individual pathways of water insecurity’s impact: (i) drinking water supply, for example by disconnecting individuals from access to water, (ii) economic growth, for example by contracting the agricultural sector, (iii) threats to ecosystems, and (iv) increased variability due to climate change, which requires more effective means of local and state-level resource governance.…”

“…Theoretically, the effects of environmental stress – and especially the effect of climate change – are complex, operate through multiple pathways, and often vary according to actor and context (Theisen, Gleditsch & Buhaug, 2013; von Uexkull et al, 2016; Döring, 2020; Koren & Bagozzi, 2017). Such relationships are often moderated , in that environmental factors have a dampening or intensifying impact on different socio-economic determinants of social conflict, rather than a simple direct effect.…”

Weather, wheat, and war: Security implications of climate variability for conflict in Syria

“…Any evidence that environmental factors led to Syria’s civil war falls in line with research that found temperature extremes (Burke et al, 2009; Hsiang, Burke & Miguel, 2013; Maystadt, Calderone & You, 2015; van Weezel, 2020) and rainfall deficits (Fjelde & von Uexkull, 2012; Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012; Maystadt & Ecker, 2014; Raleigh, Choi & Kniveton, 2015; von Uexkull et al, 2016; Harari & La Ferrara, 2018; van Weezel, 2019; Döring, 2020) elevate armed conflict risk. Weather trends will become increasingly unpredictable as climatic change continues (Giorgi, 2006; Dai, 2013) and this could have impacts on crop productivity that lead to violence (Vesco et al, 2021).…”

“…We believe that dry conditions could elevate the risk of conflict as a result of harmful livelihood losses that follow droughts (Vestby, 2019; Buhaug et al, 2020). Existing research similarly found that rainfall deficits were associated with conflict in Indonesia when irrigation is lacking (Gatti, Baylis & Crost, 2020), violence across Africa when agricultural shortages raised the price of food in local markets (Raleigh, Choi & Kniveton, 2015), and communal attacks when groundwater supplies are insufficient (Döring, 2020).…”