Commitment: Worth the Weight

Liberman, Alida; Schroeder, Mark A.

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199315192.003.0005

Cited by 13 publications

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“…When faced with a moral decision, there are often many, diverse reasons for and against the possible choices. Many philosophers argue that making and revising moral decisions ought to be a matter of deliberating over reasons, because reasons serve to favor or to justify choices for action (Broome, 2013; Crisp, 2005; Liberman & Schroeder, 2016; Parfit, 2011; Philips, 1987; Ross, 1930; Scanlon, 1998; Snedegar, 2017). In this study, we address several descriptive questions about the role of reasons in making and revising moral decisions.…”

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confidence: 99%

Reasons probably won’t change your mind: The role of reasons in revising moral decisions.

Stanley

Dougherty

Yang

et al. 2018

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

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Although many philosophers argue that making and revising moral decisions ought to be a matter of deliberating over reasons, the extent to which the consideration of reasons informs people's moral decisions and prompts them to change their decisions remains unclear. Here, after making an initial decision in 2-option moral dilemmas, participants examined reasons for only the option initially chosen (affirming reasons), reasons for only the option not initially chosen (opposing reasons), or reasons for both options. Although participants were more likely to change their initial decisions when presented with only opposing reasons compared with only affirming reasons, these effect sizes were consistently small. After evaluating reasons, participants were significantly more likely not to change their initial decisions than to change them, regardless of the set of reasons they considered. The initial decision accounted for most of the variance in predicting the final decision, whereas the reasons evaluated accounted for a relatively small proportion of the variance in predicting the final decision. This resistance to changing moral decisions is at least partly attributable to a biased, motivated evaluation of the available reasons: participants rated the reasons supporting their initial decisions more favorably than the reasons opposing their initial decisions, regardless of the reported strategy used to make the initial decision. Overall, our results suggest that the consideration of reasons rarely induces people to change their initial decisions in moral dilemmas. (PsycINFO Database Record

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confidence: 99%

Reasons probably won’t change your mind: The role of reasons in revising moral decisions.

Stanley

Dougherty

Yang

et al. 2018

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

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“…This does not mean that they cannot be outweighed. But they present themselves as concluding deliberation, seemingly leaving no discretion in how to respond to them (Darwall, 2006, p. 26, Liberman & Schroeder, 2016, p. 107, Wallace, 2019, pp. 26‐30, Zylberman, 2021, p. 402) and, indeed, they exclude considerations that would otherwise have weight from deliberation (Darwall, 2010c, Schofield, 2021, pp.…”

Section: The Main Ideamentioning

confidence: 99%

Second‐Personal Approaches to Moral Obligation

Schaab

2023

Philosophy Compass

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According to second-personal approaches to moral obligation, the distinctive normative features of moral obligation can only be explained in terms of second-personal relations, i.e. the distinctive way persons relate to each other as persons. But there are important disagreements between different groups of second-personal approaches. Most notably, they disagree about the nature of second-personal relations, which has consequences for the nature of the obligations that they purport to explain. This article aims to distinguish these groups from each other, highlight their respective advantages and disadvantages, and thereby indicate avenues for future research.

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“…4 Commitment and the features distinguishing it from other normative categories have already been discussed by philosophers (Coliva, 2016, pp. 31-32;Liberman & Shroeder, 2016;Shpall, 2014;Tebben, 2018). Here, I focus on the normative profile of commitment, namely the norms that conceptually govern commitment.…”

Section: T H E a L Lu R E A N D R Epu L Sion Of T Ru T H -Nor M Mon I Smmentioning

confidence: 99%

The norms of belief as the norms of commitment: A case for pluralism

Kazemi

2023

The Southern J of Philosophy

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Much of the discussion on the normativity of belief rests on the presupposition that there is a single fundamental truth norm governing belief that explains all of its normative features. Building on the committive conception of belief proposed by some normativists, this article takes issue with this presupposition. In particular, it is argued that belief, construed as cognitive commitment, is governed by three fundamental‐cum‐irreducible norms, which I call the “entitlement norm,” the “fulfillment norm” and the “escapability norm,” and it is shown that each of them concerns a particular normative feature of belief. Taken together, these norms can explain all the normative features of belief without leading to implausible consequences. The discussion also shows that the relationship between the truth norm and the evidence norm is more complicated than is usually conceded by normativists.

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Commitment: Worth the Weight

Cited by 13 publications

References 0 publications

Reasons probably won’t change your mind: The role of reasons in revising moral decisions.

Reasons probably won’t change your mind: The role of reasons in revising moral decisions.

Second‐Personal Approaches to Moral Obligation

The norms of belief as the norms of commitment: A case for pluralism

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