Common errors of reasoning in child protection work

Abstract

This is an electronic version of an Article published in Common Errors of Reasoning in Child Protection Work AbstractObjective: repeated public inquiries into child abuse tragedies in Britain demonstrate the level of public concern about the services designed to protect children. These inquiries identify faults in professionals' practice but the similarities in their findings indicate that they are having insufficient impact on improving practice. This study is based on the hypothesis that the recurrent errors may be explicable as examples of the typical errors of human reasoning identified by psychological research.Methods: the sample comprised all child abuse inquiry reports published in Britain between 1973 and 1994 (forty-five in total). Using a content analysis and a framework derived from psychological research on reasoning, a study was made of the reasoning of the professionals involved and the findings of the inquiries.Results: it was found that professionals based assessments of risk on a narrow range of evidence. It was biased towards the information readily available to them, overlooking significant data known to other professionals. The range was also biased towards the more memorable data, that is, towards evidence that was vivid, concrete, arousing emotion and either the first or last information received.The evidence was also often faulty, due, in the main, to biased or dishonest reporting or errors in communication. A critical attitude to evidence was found to correlate with whether or not the new information supported the existing view of the family. A major problem was that professionals were slow to revise their judgements despite a mounting body of evidence against them.Conclusions: errors in professional reasoning in child protection work are not random but predictable on the basis of research on how people intuitively simplify reasoning processes in making complex 2 judgements. These errors can be reduced if people are aware of them and strive consciously to avoid them. Aids to reasoning need to be developed that recognise the central role of intuitive reasoning but offer methods for checking intuitive judgements more rigorously and systematically.

When risk becomes invisible in the everyday life of day care

“…Identification requires an ability to collect data, to reason and a context or culture in which analysis is not only accepted but encouraged (Munro, 1999(Munro, , 2005(Munro, , 2010). …”

“…Severe cases of child abuse are often characterized by omissions (Munro, 1999); they are accompanied by false negatives, i.e., an alarm should have gone off but did not. A distinction between analytical reasoning (Munro, 1999) and intuitive processes is relevant here.…”

“…A distinction between analytical reasoning (Munro, 1999) and intuitive processes is relevant here. The two exist side by side and are not opposites but merely to be seen in a continuum.…”

“…In complex situations, such as human interactions, there are unknown variables to consider and this poses challenges for analytical reasoning, whereas intuitive processes are faster. According to Munro (1999), an important weakness of human reasoning is the unwillingness to change one's mind. Heavy caseloads coerce professionals to have a tendency to be more selective and biased with regard to the information used.…”

“…However, the concept is often used to designate problematic social or emotional behaviour, situations and/or life circumstances to which professionals must pay attention. The use of vague concepts makes identification more difficult and makes it possible that elements of risk become invisible, in the sense that professionals overlook central aspects of the children (Munro, 1999) and their life circumstances. In an attempt to create efficient multidisciplinary collaboration between pedagogues and social workers, the issue of identification and professional reasoning in uncertain situations is addressed.…”