2014
DOI: 10.1109/tac.2013.2283743
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Common Information Based Markov Perfect Equilibria for Stochastic Games With Asymmetric Information: Finite Games

Abstract: A model of stochastic games where multiple controllers jointly control the evolution of the state of a dynamic system but have access to different information about the state and action processes is considered. The asymmetry of information among the controllers makes it difficult to compute or characterize Nash equilibria. Using common information among the controllers, the game with asymmetric information is shown to be equivalent to another game with symmetric information. Further, under certain conditions, … Show more

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Cited by 83 publications
(126 citation statements)
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“…Main Results. Following the approach introduced in [15], we now construct a new game G2 with two virtual players, where at every time step t ∈ {1, . .…”
Section: Evolution Of Conditional Beliefsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 3 more Smart Citations
“…Main Results. Following the approach introduced in [15], we now construct a new game G2 with two virtual players, where at every time step t ∈ {1, . .…”
Section: Evolution Of Conditional Beliefsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One of the crucial assumptions we made in the game formulation is the strategy independence of beliefs in Assumption 2. As discussed in our companion paper [15], this assumption plays a crucial role in computing the Markov perfect Nash equilibrium of game G2 using a backward induction dynamic programming. In this section, we briefly describe the reason why this assumption is important.…”
Section: Effects On Expected Costsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…Recently, [6] generalized the results to the case when players observe signals rather than actions, and showed that the value of the stochastic game existed if one of the players was fully informed and controlled the transition of the state. A more general case when the players have common information but neither one can have full knowledge of the other one's full information is discussed in [7]- [9], which is out of the scope of this paper.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%