Common Interest Tragedies

Fennell, Lee Anne

doi:10.2139/ssrn.474380

Cited by 21 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…One can imagine a simple two-person Chicken Game (Fennell, 2004;2011). Mutual agreement would have permitted sale at the efficient price and quantity, but it will not be achieved because of dominating rational incentives to play otherwise.…”

Section: On Anticommonsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Confusions in the Anticommons

King

Major

Marian

2016

JPL

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Tragedy of the anticommons is the logical reciprocal to the better-known tragedy of the commons. It is generally characterized as a legal regime in which multiple owners hold rights of exclusion over a resource in demand. The resource cannot be put into use without a bundling of approvals from the various separate owners, yet bundling entails serious bargaining complications resulting in systematic Pareto underutilization. Nevertheless, we argue, the anticommons concept often has been employed without consistency and appropriate precision. Illustrations come primarily from the writings of Michael Heller, whose oft-cited work has been central to the anticommons literature. This paper presents a simple version of the formal anticommons model and demonstrates that relevant applications can be constructed with uniformity and analytic rigor.

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Section: On Anticommonsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Confusions in the Anticommons

King

Major

Marian

2016

JPL

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“…Under this umbrella term, we find a heterogeneous set of studies concerned, inter alia, with knowledge commons (e.g. Fennell 2004;Hess and Ostrom 2007), cultural shared resources (e.g. Bertacchini et al 2012) and global environmental commons (Buck 1998;Stern 2011).…”

Section: Protected Areas As New Commons: Insights From Existing Bodiementioning

confidence: 99%

Democratic legitimacy and new commons: examples from English protected areas

Pieraccini¹

2015

Int J Commons

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This paper explores the relationship between protected areas and commons arguing that protected areas can be seen as a form of new commons because of the different objectives and beneficiaries compared to traditional commons. If the purpose of traditional commons is sustainable resource exploitation, the primary objective of these new commons is the conservation of nature/protection of biodiversity. And if on traditional commons local resource users are the key beneficiaries, in new commons the public at large and future generations are the key beneficiaries as biodiversity is the common concern of human kind. Because of new commons' different purposes and different set of beneficiaries, normative questions need to be asked regarding who should have a say in their management and who is able to better represent the interests of nature. To answer these questions, the paper draws on deliberative democratic theory. To ground the theoretical insights empirically it presents a comparison between English protected areas at sea and on land designated under national law.

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“…8 Fennell (2004) has a good discussion of the reasons and consequences of property fragmentation. She identified some positive reasons for fragmentation: (1) fragmentation may be important for people to relinquish power over the resource without actually transferring the power or property; (2) it might be a way to temporarily force the negotiation to spread over people or generations, during which more information can be collected and information asymmetry could be avoided.…”

Section: Open Institutions Are Really About Productionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In a well-thought paper, Fennell (2004) tries to synthesize them instead of treating them as dichotomous problems. She uses an umbrella term "common interest tragedy" for both the tragedy of commons and the tragedy of anticommons, and suggests two basic requirements to identify a common interest tragedy.…”

Section: Anti-commons Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%