Common Secure Index for Conjunctive Keyword-Based Retrieval over Encrypted Data

Wang, Peishun; Wang, Huaxiong; Pieprzyk, Josef

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-75248-6_8

Cited by 22 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…MUSE is a recent but active research topic [3,4,11,14,24,25,27,30,31,33]. We note however that despite the obvious risk that the CSP obtains some prior knowledge in a MUSE system through colluding users, only few schemes on MUSE [24,25,27] consider this risk in their security model.…”

Section: Multi-user Searchable Encryptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A large number of MUSE schemes [3,4,11,14,24,25,30,31,33] share a common algorithmic structure regarding the application of queries on encrypted indices. In this structure, which we call iterative testing, an encrypted index denoted as C i is built by encrypting each keyword of W i separately.…”

Section: Common Weakness For Many Muse Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Unfortunately, a large number of MUSE schemes [3,4,11,14,24,25,30,31,33] are in this situation since they do use the iterative testing structure and the adversary can easily obtain the required prior knowledge in the multi-user setting. In the next section we discuss the impact of this new attack on an existing MUSE scheme named MK (Multi-Key searchable encryption) as well as on an existing software framework named Mylar.…”

Section: Common Weakness For Many Muse Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Leakage-Abuse Attack Against Multi-User Searchable Encryption

Rompay

Molva

Önen

2017

Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies

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Searchable Encryption (SE) allows a user to upload data to the cloud and to search it in a remote fashion while preserving the privacy of both the data and the queries. Recent research results describe attacks on SE schemes using the access pattern, denoting the ids of documents matching search queries, which most SE schemes reveal during query processing. However SE schemes usually leak more than just the access pattern, and this extra leakage can lead to attacks (much) more harmful than the ones using basic access pattern leakage only. We remark that in the special case of Multi-User Searchable Encryption (MUSE), where many users upload and search data in a cloud-based infrastructure, a large number of existing solutions have a common leakage in addition to the well-studied access pattern leakage. We show that this seemingly small extra leakage allows a very simple yet powerful attack, and that the privacy degree of the affected schemes have been overestimated. We also show that this new vulnerability affects existing software. Finally we formalize the newly identified leakage profile and show how it relates to previously defined ones.

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Section: Multi-user Searchable Encryptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Common Weakness For Many Muse Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Common Weakness For Many Muse Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Leakage-Abuse Attack Against Multi-User Searchable Encryption

Rompay

Molva

Önen

2017

Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies

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“…There exist numerous Searchable Encryption schemes for a single user [4][5][6][7][8] as well as for multiple users [9][10][11][12][13]. Practically, any single-user Searchable Encryption scheme can be adapted to define a multiuser Searchable Encryption scheme at the cost of a ciphertext size linear to the number of users in the system.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This ultimately outputs an impractical system with (| | ⋅ ) computational overhead at the Data Owner site and (| | ⋅ ) storage overhead at the server site. As solution, several Searchable Encryption schemes in [9,10,[14][15][16][17][18][19][20] with a builtin support of multiple users are devised in recent years. Amongst them, the scheme proposed by Hwang and Lee [9] is a simple extension of a single-user Searchable Encryption with the ciphertext size (| | + | | ⋅ ), where | | is the number of keywords to be searched.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multiuser Searchable Encryption with Token Freshness Verification

Sharma¹,

Jinwala²

2017

Security and Communication Networks

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A Multiuser Searchable Encryption (MUSE) can be defined with the notion of Functional Encryption (FE) where a user constructs a search token from a search key issued by an Enterprise Trusted Authority (ETA). In such scheme, a user possessing search key constructs search token at any time and consequently requests the server to search over encrypted data. Thus, an FE based MUSE scheme is not suitable for the applications where a log of search activities is maintained at the enterprise site to identify dishonest search query from any user. In addition, none of the existing searchable schemes provides security against token replay attack to avoid reuse of the same token. In this paper, therefore we propose an FE based scheme, Multiuser Searchable Encryption with Token Freshness Verification (MUSE-TFV). In MUSE-TFV, a user prepares one-time usable search token in cooperation with ETA and thus every search activity is logged at the enterprise site. Additionally, by verifying the freshness of a token, the server prevents reuse of the token. With formal security analysis, we prove the security of MUSE-TFV against chosen keyword attack and token replay attack. With theoretical and empirical analysis, we justify the effectiveness of MUSE-TFV in practical applications.

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Searchable encryption: A survey on privacy‐preserving search schemes on encrypted outsourced data

Handa

Krishna

Aggarwal

2019

Concurrency and Computation

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Outsourcing confidential data to cloud storage leads to privacy challenges that can be reduced using encryption. However, with encryption in place, the utilization of the data is reduced, which leads to reduced quality of experience of the users. To overcome this, searchable encryption (SE) schemes are utilized, which allow the end users to retrieve the relevant documents from the cloud, for which various researchers have worked utilizing different techniques. Despite the popularity of the searchable encryption schemes, most of the surveys either do not provide or present an incomplete taxonomy of SE schemes. Hence, in this paper, we attempt to present a complete taxonomy/classification of the searchable encryption schemes in terms of the type of search, type of index, results retrieved, implementation type, multiplicity of users, and the technique used. From the literature, it is observed that inner product similarity is widely adopted by researchers to compute the similarity of the query and the document index as it provides both conjunctive and disjunctive searching (ie, have better search capability) but requires high search time (ie, have lower search efficiency). On the other hand, schemes based on binary comparisons exist, which require less search time (ie, have better search efficiency) but support only conjunctive searching (ie, have limited search capability). Thus, a major conclusion drawn from our work is that there is an imbalance between search capability and search efficiency, ie, in the existing schemes, search capability can be improved at the cost of search time only. Therefore, we suggest that one direction where researchers should work on is to provide a balance between search capability and search efficiency.

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Common Secure Index for Conjunctive Keyword-Based Retrieval over Encrypted Data

Cited by 22 publications

References 8 publications

A Leakage-Abuse Attack Against Multi-User Searchable Encryption

A Leakage-Abuse Attack Against Multi-User Searchable Encryption

Multiuser Searchable Encryption with Token Freshness Verification

Searchable encryption: A survey on privacy‐preserving search schemes on encrypted outsourced data

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