Commoning in dynamic environments: community-based management of turtle nesting sites on the lower Amazon floodplain

Abstract

Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) involves a system of local practices designed to regulate access to, and use of, natural resources through rules and norms shared by a set of users. These institutions are usually defined through rational motivations that drive collective action and well-delimited social and spatial boundaries. We discuss the shortcomings of these premises in dynamic ecological systems where the location of resource concentrations is ephemeral. We explore four cases of communitybased management of river turtle nesting sites on the lower Amazon floodplain. Despite the high ecological risks, monitoring costs, and limited material benefits, community residents remain motivated to engage in this collective activity. Based on information from numerous studies carried out over a period of two decades, we discuss how motivation to develop CBNRMs has changed over time and space and how intercommunity linkages have contributed to the endurance of this local institution.

Co‐management of culturally important species: A tool to promote biodiversity conservation and human well‐being

“…This is the case of the turtle management scheme, for example, in which community ethics and emotional connection with Podocnemis spp. are the main motivations for local engagement (Pezzuti et al, ; Table ). Nevertheless, motivations can change over time.…”

“…A striking difference between our two case studies reinforce this point. While arapaima co‐management has been acclaimed by the media, the government and NGOs, and there is a widely built perception that the scheme is fruitful for the community and relevant to conservation (CTF and JVCS personal observation), beach protection is a neglected initiative with little public profile throughout the region, despite its long history and great importance (Pezzuti et al, ; Table ). Such lack of societal appreciation, together with the poor financial viability of the initiative, might lead to its future failure, as anticipated by many beach guards (Campos‐Silva et al, ).…”

“…In contrast to the arapaima co‐management, the turtle management scheme does not represent a cash‐earning opportunity for the community and cannot become financially self‐sufficient over time, due to the legal impediment to the harvest and trade of turtles and their eggs in Brazil (Brazilian Fauna Protection Law, Nº 5197, 3rd January ; Brazilian Environmental Crimes Law, Nº 9605, 12th February ). The material benefits, if any, are restricted to the beach guards’ nominal payment only, and are negligible considering the high workload the activity demands and the risks involved (Campos‐Silva et al, ; Pezzuti et al, ). Indeed, beach guards are exposed to frequent threats of violence from poachers, including death threats (CTF and JVCS personal observation).…”

“…investment on basic equipment or on fuel for patrols—and official enforcement—e.g. application of formal sanctions to identified poachers (Campos‐Silva et al, ; Pezzuti et al, ; CTF and JVCS personal observation). At the same time, however, beach guards often highlight the strengthening of local cultural values as a great positive outcome from the turtle conservation scheme (Campos‐Silva et al, ).…”

“…At the same time, however, beach guards often highlight the strengthening of local cultural values as a great positive outcome from the turtle conservation scheme (Campos‐Silva et al, ). Furthermore, communities where protected beaches emerge are seen as privileged areas, and residents feel proud of the increasingly abundant turtle population (Pezzuti et al, ).…”