Communication &amp; competition

Goeree, Jacob K.; Zhang, Jingjing

doi:10.1007/s10683-013-9376-6

Cited by 17 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…The regressor was the relevant condition dummy. We found no difference in rejection rates across conditions 14 . The power on the part of the recipient to select her proposer hence induced no difference in the aggregate rate of rejection of offers.…”

Section: Offer Rejectioncontrasting

confidence: 68%

“…None of these have allowed for communication. Our article is closer to the nascent line scrutinizing partnership formation and performancein situations where partner selection is on the basis of non-binding communication: see Dulleck, Kerschbamer and Sutter [12], Beck, Kerschbamer, Qiu and Sutter [13], both on credence goods, and Goeree and Zhang [14], who examine principal-agent interactions in hidden information environments 5 .…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 93%

“…A key finding is thus that recipients in US and UC reject an offer (and hence bear the cost of punishment) with greater likelihood if the prior attendant promise (on the basis of which the proposer was selected) is higher, while they do not in UB. Thus, H4 is rejected for environments with 14 The number of observations was 196, 216 and 220 for comparisons UB vs. US, UB vs. UC and US vs. UC respectively.…”

Section: Offer Rejectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Partner Selection and the Division of Surplus: Evidence from Ultimatum and Dictator Experiments

Banerjee

Chakravarty

Ghosh

2016

Games

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Abstract:We study ultimatum and dictator environments with one-way, unenforceable pre-play communication from the proposer to the recipient, semantically framed as a promise. After observing this promise regarding how much the proposer will offer if selected, in our treatment conditions, recipients choose whether or not to select a particular proposer. We find that offers can increase in the ultimatum game both with non-competitive selection with a single potential proposer, and more so with competition, where the recipient chooses one of two potential proposers, as compared to the no selection baseline. Furthermore, the offer is rejected with higher probability if the promisemade by the selected proposer is higher than the eventual offer. Our dictator environment does not give the power to reject offers, thus selection power carries no benefits in the dictator game. Finally, independent of the game institution or proposer selection mechanism, promises provide credible signals for offers.

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Section: Offer Rejectioncontrasting

confidence: 68%

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Offer Rejectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Partner Selection and the Division of Surplus: Evidence from Ultimatum and Dictator Experiments

Banerjee

Chakravarty

Ghosh

2016

Games

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“…They observe that promise making by experts tends to increase the relative frequency at which consumers agree to trade. Goeree and Zhang (2014) successfully replicate the results obtained by Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) and extend the game by introducing competition between second movers based on their messages sent to first movers. With respect to efficiency, they observe that communication and competition act as substitutes.…”

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confidence: 74%

The role of communication content and reputation in the choice of transaction partners

Brosig-Koch

Heinrich

2018

Games and Economic Behavior

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T. (2018) 'The role of communication content and reputation in the choice of transaction partners : a study based on eld and laboratory data. ', Games and economic behavior., Additional information: Use policyThe full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.We study the effects of communication content and its interaction with reputation on the choice of transaction partners in markets with moral hazard. We find that buyers" choices of sellers are influenced by prices and reputation information as well as by sellers" messages: buyers prefer sellers who make specific promises. If specific promises are infeasible, buyers prefer sellers whose arguments reduce the social distance.These observations do not depend on the availability of reputation information. We also find that, if specific promises are feasible, buyers" profits do not significantly differ from hypothetical profits realized under a correct expectations rule.JEL Codes: D44, D83, L14 * We thank Nicolas Fugger, Jason Shachat, Lijia Tan, and numerous seminar and conference participants for very valuable comments and suggestions. Lisa Seeger and Franziska Then provided excellent research assistance. Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (BR 2346/3-1) is gratefully acknowledged. Mimra et al., 2016), less research has been dedicated to the role of communication between sellers and buyers (and its interplay with reputation). From a game-theoretic point of view, communication is cheap talk and does not influence behavior whenever the interests of agents are opposed. If their interests are similar, communication can influence outcomes by helping agents to coordinate (see Crawford, 1998, for a summary). Starting with experimental work on social dilemmas, namely the prisoner"s dilemma and the public good game, cheap-talk communication has nevertheless been observed to influence human behavior in a variety of games. Among others, communication between players can increase the efficiency and equality of outcomes in bilateral bargaining (e.g., Roth, 1995). During the last decades, several potential explanations for the observed influence of communication have emerged. One popular explanation is that communication allows agents to reduce the social distance, thereby making the opponent"s payoff more salient or allowing for reputation building. Social distance is put forward, for example, to explain varying donations in dictator games (see, e.g., Charness and Gneezy, 2008, on the role of names). Another prominent explanation is based on the impact of (non-binding) promises ...

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“…Building on the framework of Charness and Dufwenberg (2011), Goeree and Zhang (2014) introduce competition among agents. Their aim is to study whether communication leads to efficient contracting also in the scenario where two agents compete for a single job.…”

Section: Hidden Information Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Behavioral Aspects of Communication in Organizations

Casoria¹,

Riedl

Werner

2020

SSRN Journal

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This paper reviews experimental studies that investigate the effects of communication on behavior in organizational settings. Two main classes of studies are identified: (a) studies on coordination and competition, which include experimental research that tests whether communication can help to overcome coordination failure within organizations, and (b) studies that analyze the role of communication in alleviating problems arising from information asymmetries at the workplace. The evidence from these studies indicates that communication is suited to improve efficient coordination within firms and to mitigate information problems in employer-employee relationships. In addition, studies are presented that focus on the interaction between communication and monetary incentive schemes in companies.organizations. The experimental approach is especially well-suited for this purpose for at least the following reasons. First, the effects of communication on behavior are difficult to study with observational field data (for instance, company data), as it is basically impossible to reliably track communication patterns between colleagues or between managers and team members. Second, the alternative of using surveys to get insights into the communication patterns and contents between managers and employees also has some shortcomings. For instance, data from surveys might be noisy and inconsistent due to the lack of explicit incentives to think carefully about potential answers. Survey answers about the role of communication within the organization also might not provide the correct picture because of socially desirable answers (e.g., if employees are asked about the way their supervisors communicate with them).Experiments circumvent some of these problems by providing explicit performance based incentives and by controlling the way communication can take place as well as by restricting the feasible communication content. Regarding the role of communication in organizations mostly laboratory experiments and a few field experiments have been been conducted. Both types of experiments have their advantages and disadvantages (for a discussion, see, e.g., Harrison and List, 2004;Levitt and List, 2007;Falk and Heckman, 2009;Levitt and List, 2009) and should be viewed as complementary approaches in gaining insights into the role of communication at the workplace.This paper focuses on studies related to the topics "coordination and competition" and "asymmetric information" because those are of central relevance for processes within organizations. Coordination of activities is key to achieve the goals of organizations in which a large number of members take independent but interactive decisions. The degree to which coordination can be successfully achieved depends on incentives. In some cases, the incentives of agents are aligned so that everyone profits from successful collaboration, making it relatively easy to achieve coordinated behavior that is also in line with the organization's interest. In other circumstances, agents or organ...

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Communication & competition

Cited by 17 publications

References 32 publications

Partner Selection and the Division of Surplus: Evidence from Ultimatum and Dictator Experiments

Partner Selection and the Division of Surplus: Evidence from Ultimatum and Dictator Experiments

The role of communication content and reputation in the choice of transaction partners

Behavioral Aspects of Communication in Organizations

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