Communication and Cooperation in Repeated Games

Awaya, Yu; Krishna, Vijay

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2914062

Cited by 7 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Hereafter, we will briefly explain what a coarse correlated equilibrium is, and then how ε is determined. Precise arguments can be found in sections 2 and 4 of Awaya and Krishna ().…”

Section: Bound On Equilibrium Payoff Setmentioning

confidence: 91%

“…What happens in a more general case? Awaya and Krishna () construct an equilibrium that works with a general repeated game. When

ρ (p^{h}, p^{h}, p^{h})

is sufficiently big, the profit of each firm is arbitrarily close to the monopolist profit

π^{M}

.…”

Section: Exchange Of Firm‐specific Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For a fixed δ , ε is increasing in η and

\underset{η \to 0}{falselim} ϵ \to 0 .

Formal definition of monitoring quality involves total variation distance, and the interested reader can find this in section 2 of Awaya and Krishna (). The formula for log‐normal distribution is presented in section 3 of Awaya and Krishna ().…”

Section: Bound On Equilibrium Payoff Setmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Awaya and Krishna (), we show that exchange of aggregate sales data, which are deemed to be legal, can also be anti‐competitive. I also describe an upper bound of the set of equilibrium payoffs of a general repeated game, developed by Awaya and Krishna (), which plays a key role in understanding the effect of information exchange on firms’ profits.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Collusion and Information Exchange

Awaya

2019

Jpn Econ Rev

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Antitrust authorities view that exchange of individual firms’ sales data is more anti‐competitive than that of aggregate sales data. In this paper, I survey antitrust implications of such inter‐firm information exchange. I argue that both types of information exchange are anti‐competitive under some circumstances. More precisely, I compare profits when each type of information exchange is allowed to that when firms can only observe their own sales (Stigler’s secret price‐cutting model), and the former is bigger than the latter. I also provide a general method to bound the equilibrium profits without such information exchange.

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“…Hereafter, we will briefly explain what a coarse correlated equilibrium is, and then how ε is determined. Precise arguments can be found in sections 2 and 4 of Awaya and Krishna ().…”

Section: Bound On Equilibrium Payoff Setmentioning

confidence: 91%

“…What happens in a more general case? Awaya and Krishna () construct an equilibrium that works with a general repeated game. When

ρ (p^{h}, p^{h}, p^{h})

is sufficiently big, the profit of each firm is arbitrarily close to the monopolist profit

π^{M}

.…”

Section: Exchange Of Firm‐specific Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For a fixed δ , ε is increasing in η and

\underset{η \to 0}{falselim} ϵ \to 0 .

Section: Bound On Equilibrium Payoff Setmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Collusion and Information Exchange

Awaya

2019

Jpn Econ Rev

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“…Lately, Awaya and Krishna [6,7] and Spector [8] also showed the necessity of communication. In particular, Awaya and Krishna [6] considered Stigler's 1964 secret price cutting model where firms compete in prices and sales are drawn from a log-normal distribution.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Private Monitoring and Communication in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma

Awaya

2021

Games

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This paper provides a model of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which cheap-talk communication is necessary in order to achieve cooperative outcomes in a long-term relationship. The model is one of complete information. I consider a continuous time repeated prisoner’s dilemma game where informative signals about another player’s past actions arrive following a Poisson process; actions have to be held fixed for a certain time. I assume that signals are privately observed by players. I consider an environment where signals are noisy, and the correlation of signals is higher if both players cooperate. We show that, provided that players can change their actions arbitrary frequently, there exists an equilibrium with communication that strictly Pareto-dominates all equilibria without communication.

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Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion

Spector

2022

Rev Ind Organ

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HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

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Communication and Cooperation in Repeated Games

Cited by 7 publications

References 32 publications

Collusion and Information Exchange

Collusion and Information Exchange

Private Monitoring and Communication in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma

Cheap Talk, Monitoring and Collusion

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