2006
DOI: 10.1016/j.entcs.2006.02.015
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Communication Attitudes: A Formal Approach to Ostensible Intentions, and Individual and Group Opinions

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Cited by 11 publications
(18 citation statements)
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“…This corresponds more or less to the communication act semantics which we have introduced in [11,5,12], and to Grice's conceptualization of speech acts as communications of intentions. publicBelief means here more or less the same as assertion, but in distinction from the latter publicBelief is a passive stance and does not necessarily comprise the person's intention to make the addressees approve the respective statement but merely that a person agrees with some statement (but note that it is not possible to communicate an information p without the implicit assertion that p is indeed an information...).…”
Section: Social Ontologiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…This corresponds more or less to the communication act semantics which we have introduced in [11,5,12], and to Grice's conceptualization of speech acts as communications of intentions. publicBelief means here more or less the same as assertion, but in distinction from the latter publicBelief is a passive stance and does not necessarily comprise the person's intention to make the addressees approve the respective statement but merely that a person agrees with some statement (but note that it is not possible to communicate an information p without the implicit assertion that p is indeed an information...).…”
Section: Social Ontologiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…modal Belief-Desire-Intention logics (but see [5,11]). Instead, we only demand that the inner statements of each context are mutually consistent (basic rationality):…”
Section: Meta-axiomsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The crucial point is that a private semantics does not make it possible for a language user to be objectively wrong about an interpretation from a third person point of view. In contrast to FIPA, beliefs and intentions are not interpreted as private mental attitudes, but as some kind of public mental attitudes, for example as grounded beliefs [27] or as ostensible beliefs or public opinions [41].…”
Section: Agent Communication Languagesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To keep the formal details of this paper within limits, we do not detail the operational semantics of the speech acts, but sketch informally their effects and illustrate them by a running example. Formalizations of speech acts with public mental attitudes can be found in [27,30,41].…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Intuitively, we want to express that, after uttering, the knowledge source (human, agent, web service...) is committed to his assertion. To represent such states, we have chosen the approach introduced in [7,4] and the more or less equivalent approach presented in [6,5] as a starting point for the semantics of web communication. Our approach demarcates itself strongly both from the well-known BDI agent model and from multiagent belief modeling (including dynamic epistemic models such as public announcement logic, which is not concerned with opinions in our sense but with the effects of announcements on beliefs [3]).…”
Section: A Communication-oriented Model Of Web Semanticsmentioning
confidence: 99%