Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring

Laclau, Marie

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2014.04.009

Cited by 15 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…This paper is also related to the literature on repeated games on networks, where the network models the monitoring structure and/or the communication possibilities. See, among others, Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996), Laclau (2012Laclau ( , 2014, Renault and Tomala (1998), Tomala (2011) and Wolitzky (2015). This literature characterizes the networks for which folk theorems obtain.…”

Section: Figure 1 Illustration Of the Difficultiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robust communication on networks

Laclau,

Renou,

Venel

2020

Preprint

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We consider sender-receiver games, where the sender and the receiver are two distinct nodes in a communication network. Communication between the sender and the receiver is thus indirect. We ask when it is possible to robustly implement the equilibrium outcomes of the direct communication game as equilibrium outcomes of indirect communication games on the network. Robust implementation requires that: (i) the implementation is independent of the preferences of the intermediaries and (ii) the implementation is guaranteed at all histories consistent with unilateral deviations by the intermediaries.Robust implementation of direct communication is possible if and only if either the sender and receiver are directly connected or there exist two disjoint paths between the sender and the receiver.

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Section: Figure 1 Illustration Of the Difficultiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robust communication on networks

Laclau,

Renou,

Venel

2020

Preprint

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“…19 this approach is in contrast to the standard approach of enforcing cooperation on networks via contagion strategies in which players learn information through the network by being defected on when punishment is underway. Kandori 1992;ellison 1994;Wolitzky 2013; acemoglu and Wolitzky 2016. 20 Balmaceda and escobar 2017; Jackson, rodriguez-Barraquer, and tan 2012; lippert and spagnolo 2011; ali and miller 2013.…”

Section: A Model Of Interactions In Weak Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…matching is, by assumption, independent of g. it can be shown that all results here continue to hold if players are more likely to play a neighbor in g, as long as the probability of playing a network neighbor is not precisely 1.27 e.g., okuno-fujiwara and Postelwaite 1995. 28 e.g.,Kandori 1992. …”

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confidence: 99%

Why the West Became Wild

Larson¹

2017

World Pol.

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Settlers flocking to boomtowns on the American western frontier were faced with the same task that communities in weak states across the globe face in contemporary times: self-governance. Peer sanctions can enforce cooperation in these environments, but their efficacy depends on the social networks that transmit information from peer to peer. The author uses a game-theoretic model to show that peripheral network positions can generate such strong incentives to misbehave that persistent cheating occurs in equilibrium. The model reveals that groups maintaining high levels of cooperation that face shocks to their strategic environment or to their network can ratchet down into less cooperative equilibria in which the most peripheral become ostracized. Furthermore, population change that features rapid growth, high turnover, and enclave settlements can undermine cooperation. The insights from this article help to explain the trajectory of cooperation in the mining towns of the Wild West in which high levels of cooperation deteriorated as the population surged, and help to make sense of why only certain nonwhite settlers were targets of hostility and racism.

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“…There are other works that share similarities with our paper, in that agents are located in a network and each agent only observes the actions chosen by his neighbors. Ben‐Porath and Kahneman (), Renault and Tomala (), Haag and Lagunoff (), and Laclau (, ) are examples. Despite these similarities, they pay little attention to the stability of equilibria.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game with local interaction and local communication

Cho

2014

Int J of Economic Theory

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This paper considers a repeated prisoner's dilemma game in a network in which each agent interacts with his neighbors and cannot observe the actions of other agents who are not directly connected to him. If there is global information processing through public randomization and global communication, it is not difficult to construct a sequential equilibrium which supports cooperation and satisfies a property, called stability, which requires that cooperation resumes after any history. In this paper, we allow agents to locally communicate with their neighbors and show that it is possible to construct such an equilibrium without global information processing. Here, the role of local communication is to resolve the discrepancy of agents’ expectations about their neighbor's future actions.

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Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring

Cited by 15 publications

References 38 publications

Robust communication on networks

Robust communication on networks

Why the West Became Wild

Cooperation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game with local interaction and local communication

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