2019
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.11.007
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Communication is more than information sharing: The role of status-relevant knowledge

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2

Citation Types

0
3
0

Year Published

2021
2021
2025
2025

Publication Types

Select...
3
2
1

Relationship

3
3

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 11 publications
(3 citation statements)
references
References 35 publications
0
3
0
Order By: Relevance
“…because it favours them economically, or because their partisan alignment is a critical part of their identity [ 62 ]—it limits their ability to process information in an unbiased manner. While our model considers the behavioural biases of the receivers of information, it neglects the motives of the senders of information [ 86 , 87 ]. In a world that relies increasingly on highly specialized expert knowledge, while at the same time citizens’ trust in experts is being constantly undermined by populist leaders and media outlets, future work should expand our model to capture the interplay between expert senders and non-expert receivers of information.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…because it favours them economically, or because their partisan alignment is a critical part of their identity [ 62 ]—it limits their ability to process information in an unbiased manner. While our model considers the behavioural biases of the receivers of information, it neglects the motives of the senders of information [ 86 , 87 ]. In a world that relies increasingly on highly specialized expert knowledge, while at the same time citizens’ trust in experts is being constantly undermined by populist leaders and media outlets, future work should expand our model to capture the interplay between expert senders and non-expert receivers of information.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…because it favors them economically, or because their partisan alignment is a critical part of their identity [37] -it limits their ability to process information in an unbiased manner. While our reinforcement model captures the behavioral biases of the receivers of information, it neglects the motives of the senders of information [45,34]. In a world that relies increasingly on highly specialized expert knowledge, while at the same time citizens' trust in experts is being constantly undermined by populist leaders and media outlets, future work should expand our model to capture the interplay between expert senders and non-expert receivers of information.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For a recent review, see Vostroknutov ( 2020 ). Another large strand of literature models the effect of (moral) identity on people’s behavior as a Bayesian preference-signaling game (Bénabou and Tirole 2006 , 2011 ; Grossman and van der Weele 2017 ; Kurschilgen and Marcin 2019 ).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%