Communication with endogenous deception costs

Eilat, Ran; Neeman, Zvika

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2022.105572

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…This is justifiable when the parties have their reputation to maintain, and there are substantial penalties to one's reputation for lying. We also know from the literature that Bayesian persuasion results are robust to minor departures from full commitment (Elliot Lipnowski, Doron Ravid and Denis Shishkin, 2022;Yingni Guo and Eran Shmaya, 2021;Daehong Min, 2021;Ran Eilat and Zvika Neeman, 2023).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Constructive versus Toxic Argumentation in Debates

Mylovanov,

Zapechelnyuk

2024

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

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Two debaters address an audience by sequentially choosing their information strategies. We compare the setting where the second mover reveals additional information (constructive argumentation) with the setting where the second mover obfuscates the first mover’s information (toxic argumentation). We reframe both settings as constrained optimization of the first mover. We show that when the preferences are zero-sum or risk-neutral, constructive debates reveal the state, while toxic debates are completely uninformative. Moreover, constructive debates reveal the state under the assumption on preferences that capture autocratic regimes, whereas toxic debates are completely uninformative under the assumption on preferences that capture democratic regimes. (JEL D72, D82, D83)

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Constructive versus Toxic Argumentation in Debates

Mylovanov,

Zapechelnyuk

2024

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

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“…One can interpret the principal's ability to change her mind after observing private information as her lack of commitment. In this sense, our paper is related to the literature that investigates information design where the principal chooses an information structure without full commitment to its messages (Guo and Shmaya, 2021;Lipnowski, Ravid, and Shishkin, 2022;Min, 2021;Eilat and Neeman, 2023). In these models, failure to commit means cheap talk.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals

Zapechelnyuk

2023

Econ Theory

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We compare information design, or Bayesian persuasion, by an uninformed principal (who has no information about the state of the world when making her choice) and by an informed principal (who has private information and can condition her choice on that information). We show that, under the assumptions of monotone preferences of the principal and nondegenerate information structures, a Pareto undominated outcome is implementable by the uninformed principal if and only if it is implementable by the informed principal.

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Bayesian Broadcasting: The Politician's Handbook to the Free Media

Gottesman

2024

SSRN Journal

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Communication with endogenous deception costs

Cited by 3 publications

References 31 publications

Constructive versus Toxic Argumentation in Debates

Constructive versus Toxic Argumentation in Debates

On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals

Bayesian Broadcasting: The Politician's Handbook to the Free Media

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