Communism as the unhappy coming

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe show that Eastern Orthodox believers are less happy compared to those of Catholic and Protestant faith using data covering more than 100 countries around the world. Consistent with the happiness results, we also find that relative to Catholics, Protestants and non-believers, those of Eastern Orthodox religion have less social capital and prefer old ideas and safe jobs. In addition, Orthodoxy is associated with leftleaning political preferences and stronger support for government involvement in the economy. Compared to non-believers and Orthodox adherents, Catholics and Protestants are less likely to agree that government ownership is a good thing, and Protestants are less likely to agree that getting rich can only happen at the expense of others. These differences in life satisfaction and other attitudes and values persisted despite the fact that communist elites sought to eradicate church-going in Eastern Europe, since communists maintained many aspects of Orthodox theology which were useful for the advancement of the communist doctrine. The findings are consistent with Berdyaev's (1933Berdyaev's ( , 1937 hypothesis of communism as a successor of Orthodoxy.

Influence Of Orthodoxy Philosophical And Religious Ideas On Right Of Privacy Formation

“…The right to private life, introduced into the system of constitutional law at the end of the 20th century, provided the people with what in Western countries became the result of a difficult historical life (Davis, 2008). In many aspects it did not solve the problem of legal regulation of private life in new social economic conditions (Djankov & Nikolova, 2018). Two obligatory stages in the formation of the right of private life were excluded: a) the discovery of a legal motive caused by the urgent natural, socio-economic and other needs (factors) in the legal regulation of certain types of social relations (such needs could not arise in a socialist society, even if it has undergone a certain reform of the economy, rejecting the idea of personalization and autonomy of man); b) the formation on the basis of a legal motive by various public institutions of civil society of a coordinated will, which requires elevation to a normative, universal rank (in the 6-year period of the restructuring of Soviet society (1985)(1986)(1987)(1988)(1989)(1990)(1991).…”

Remnants of Communism and Present-Day Inequality

“…Though we maintain that our results are consistent with the powerful socialization effects of communism, we acknowledge that we have not tapped potential variability in its effects on individuals having grown up under communist regimes. Whereas we controlled for a number of different variables, scholars have documented the moderating influence of religion, such as the specific Christian denominations (Djankov & Nikolova, 2018), political ideologies (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2019) and the specific periods of communist regimes and socialization (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2014). Scholars such as Shiller et al (1992) also argued that specifics of how individuals experienced the transition did qualify their social attitudes.…”

“…The LiTS examined former communist countries’ transition toward an open market-oriented economy, the role of the state, and other issues surrounding democracy. These data were used in previous investigations of the effects of communism on people’s livelihood (e.g., Djankov & Nikolova, 2018), and provided us with an opportunity to replicate our general prediction concerning the long-term effects of socialization under communism, namely, that having spent one’s formative years under communism implied that individuals were more likely to hold on to notions of equality (by government intervention), which then shaped their evaluations of contemporary society. These data allowed us to control for the effects of communist party membership and negative experiences under communism (i.e., whether communist regimes have tortured respondents and their family members or caused restrictions like not allowing the practice of religion)—in addition to similar variables controlled for in the EQLS when examining the interaction of age and inequality.…”

Height and well-being during the transition from plan to market

“…Economists have long debated the mechanisms driving this "transition happiness gap." 1 Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2009) associate this lower life satisfaction with the traumatic experience of macroeconomic instability in the early years, the deterioration of public goods and rising income inequality, while other work points to dissatisfaction with national governments and the role of Eastern Orthodoxy (Djankov and Nikolova, 2018).…”