In this article, I focus on the factor of age as a determinant of individual support for the use of force by the government. I argue that socialization theory, as a key conceptual frame, should be supplemented by rational choice explanations for understanding individual preferences more fully. Employing survey data on the Chechen conflict, I investigate generational gaps in Russia regarding the government's use of force, and the form those gaps take. Empirically, I substantiate a theoretical claim that several generations exist in Russia, each with its own attitudes and beliefs, including the so‐called “second edition of the Decembrists,” “the people of the ‘60s,” “the people of the ‘70s,” “the generation of perestroika,” “the disappointed generation,” and a “lost generation/mega‐consumers.” I find strong, albeit surprising, evidence of a generational gap in Russia, with respondents born in different time periods, especially “the ‘60s people” and “mega‐consumers” expressing variable attitudes toward the Chechnya conflict.
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