2002
DOI: 10.1016/s0962-6298(02)00029-x
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Community, corruption, landscape: tales from the tree trade

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Cited by 63 publications
(24 citation statements)
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“…While the bribes reported by Robbins represented small percentages of the value of the products harvested, Corbridge and Kumar (2002) report that a farmer who wished to sell jackfruit timber off of his private land in Jharkhand received only 1/5 of the value of his timber, with approximately paid to a broker, and the remainder paid as bribes to forest and police officials. According to Corbridge and Kumar, the necessity of paying such enormous bribes has hindered the planting of jackfruit since the 1940s, crippling the potential for the development of a vibrant agroforestry sector in the state (similar hindrances plague the development of private-land forestry and the development of forest-based industries throughout India-see Milne et al 2005).…”
Section: Informal External Direction: ''Sly'' Institutions and Corrupmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…While the bribes reported by Robbins represented small percentages of the value of the products harvested, Corbridge and Kumar (2002) report that a farmer who wished to sell jackfruit timber off of his private land in Jharkhand received only 1/5 of the value of his timber, with approximately paid to a broker, and the remainder paid as bribes to forest and police officials. According to Corbridge and Kumar, the necessity of paying such enormous bribes has hindered the planting of jackfruit since the 1940s, crippling the potential for the development of a vibrant agroforestry sector in the state (similar hindrances plague the development of private-land forestry and the development of forest-based industries throughout India-see Milne et al 2005).…”
Section: Informal External Direction: ''Sly'' Institutions and Corrupmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…National proposals to create a lokpal (ombudsman) seem unlikely to have a direct impact on the small scale corruption which afflicts forest administration. Several authors have suggested liberalizing trade in forest products as a means to both enhance private-land forestry and reduce opportunities forest officials have to serve as monopoly providers of forest goods (Corbridge and Kumar 2002;Milne et al 2005). However, Wade's studies demonstrated that bureaucrats were skillful at subverting formal designs aimed at increasing transparency, while Robbins showed how corruption was embedded within broader networks of disadvantage, and thus might more productively be seen as an issue of collective action rather than individual failing (see also Persson et al 2013;Sundström 2015a).…”
Section: Informal External Direction: ''Sly'' Institutions and Corrupmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Where local use is criminalized, there are pressures and opportunities for informal economic transactions, moreover, sometimes termed "corruption" (though the term and its concomitant connotations are typically misleading, see De Sardan 1999;Robbins 2000c;Corbridge and Kumar 2002;Jeffrey 2002). Such systems of exchange, though themselves understudied, might be anticipated to price cash poor households out of markets for illegal goods.…”
Section: Anticipating Noncompliancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Again, as Corbridge and Kumar (2002) note, systems of entrenched power are difficult to shift or change without sustained political activity to transfer resources to the poor. This study and its recommendations are therefore part of these continuing discussions to keep Ghana's decentralisation on track within the context of socio-economic development and poverty reduction.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%