Company characteristics and compliance with ASX corporate governance principles

Abstract

Purpose – This study aims to examine whether company characteristics determine the structure and composition of a company’s board. In particular, it investigates the three board-design choices that Australian-listed companies make in the context of Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) corporate governance principles (published in 2003) where they are allowed to depart from the recommended best-practice board structure if the departure better serves their unique board and governance requirements. Design/methodology/approach – A logistic regression is performed on a cross-section of data for 258 ASX-listed companies averaged over the years 2004 to 2007, using the company variables size, age, leverage, ownership concentration, profitability, liquidity, price-earnings ratio, market-to-book ratio and cross-listing. Findings – The study finds that size has a strong, statistically significant impact on all three principles. Ownership concentration, price-earnings ratio and age have statistically significant impacts on the likelihood of compliance with at least one principle but have no consistent influence over all. This finding supports the underlying philosophy of the ASX corporate governance principles that flexible guidelines serve companies better than inflexible rules. Originality/value – This study breaks new ground in empirically investigating the effect of company variables on compliance with the ASX’s Principles of 2003, which are new for Australia in requiring an “if not, why not” response from companies.

Organizational characteristics and COVID-19 safety practices among small and medium construction enterprises (SMEs) in Nigeria

“…Other predictors; include workforce, years of establishment and assets of SMEs. The findings of this study align with Lama and Anderson (2015), Okafor (2007), Shittu et al (2016) and consistent with institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983;Meyer and Rowan, 1977;Oliver, 1991;Zucker, 1987).…”

“…Studies revealed that although the central idea of institutional theory is isomorphic behavior, organizations differ in their strategic responses to institutional forces, organizations may decide to avoid, compromise, defy and manipulate the institutional environment based on organizational characteristics. (Lama and Anderson, 2015;Moser et al, 2020;Oliver, 1991;Shittu et al, 2016). Institutional theory has been projected to be a suitable lens to examine the dynamics of organizational strategic responses to regulations (Moser et al, 2020;Raynard et al, 2015).…”

“…This will assist in investigating the underlying dynamics of COVID-19 safety practices and the influence of organizational characteristics which are expressed based on their total assets, workforce, annual turnover, years of establishment and area of specialization of SMEs. Organizations differ in their strategic responses to institutional forces; organizations may decide to avoid, compromise, defy and manipulate the institutional environment based on organizational characteristics (Lama and Anderson, 2015;Moser et al, 2020;Oliver, 1991;Raynard et al, 2015;Shittu et al, 2016). However, a review of studies conducted on COVID-19 safety management falls short of explaining the role of organizational characteristics in shaping the attitudes of SMEs toward COVID-19 safety practices (Al Amri and Marey-P erez, 2020;Ezeokoli et al, 2020;Gbadamosi et al, 2020;Hollingsworth, 2020;Ogunnusi et al, 2020;Shibani et al, 2020;Simpeh and Amoah, 2021).…”

Remuneration committees, shareholder dissent on CEO pay and the CEO pay–performance link

“…In addition, examining smaller companies in an Australian voluntary compliance setting contrasts with prior research conducted in the United States (Anderson and Bizjak, ; Vafeas, ; Sun and Cahan, ; Sun et al ., ; Conyon, ) where requirements for remuneration committee formation and independence are mandatory and the general regulatory environment differs substantially (Monem and Ng, ) . Empirical evidence indicates that a one size fits all regulatory approach is inefficient because optimal governance arrangements vary significantly across companies (Christensen et al ., ; Lama and Anderson, ) and the costs of compliance can significantly outweigh benefits (Linck et al ., ; Dhole et al ., ). Therefore, examining the effects of voluntary adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations provides useful information regarding the choice between a voluntary and mandatory regulatory policy.…”

“If not, why not” form of governance

“…However, the ASX has provided no information about factors that may have caused these rates to occur, thereby shedding little light on treatment by firms of the explanation requirement. Lama and Anderson (2015) found on a sample of ASX firms, with respect to board-member independence and CEOboard chair separation, that smaller firms and firms with shareholdings concentrated in ARJ 32,2 relatively fewer hands had a lower rate of compliance but the authors did not investigate the nature of responses made when an explanation was called for.…”