Comparative Analysis of Sequential and Combinatorial Auctions Based on Petri Nets

Zhang, Xiaodan; Tang, Huajun; Yang, Donghai; El-Meligy, Mohammed A.; Li, Zhiwu

doi:10.1109/access.2018.2840539

Cited by 7 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 65 publications

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“…To study bidding auctions in the supply chain, Zhang et al [66] used CTPNs to develop models for analysing sequential and combinatorial auctions. This work supplements Zhang et al's [67] study by comparing the hazard levels of six cases of the integrated bidding process. It contributes to a mechanism that can be further applied to study similar problems in different types of auctions.…”

Section: Conclusion a The Casual Factors Of Bidder Collusionsupporting

confidence: 54%

“…In 2011, Zhang et al [62] conducted a literature review on Petri nets' applications in SCM and found only one study that used an auction Petri net model in manufacturing (Nandula and Murali [65]). Most recently, Zhang et al compared the performance of first-price and sealed-bid auctions with online dynamic auctions [66] and combinatorial auctions [67]. Therefore, using Petri nets to study auctions is rare.…”

Section: B Modeling With Petri Netsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Zhang et al embed programming solver into transition nodes of a CTPN [67] and they compared the supply chain coordination performance of a first-price sealed-bid multiobject sequential auction with a first-price sealed-bid combinatorial auction. Their study showed how the CTPN tool can be used to graphically describe every stage of a reverse auction, as well as the bidding data and decision algorithms in each one.…”

Section: B Modeling With Petri Netsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Hazard Analysis of Bidder Collusion in Reverse Auctions Based on Petri Nets

et al. 2020

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Bidder collusion in reverse auctions is a pervasive phenomenon that leads to a series of problems for buyers and their supply chains. This work aims to conduct a hazard analysis on a first-price sealed-bid reverse auction with bidder collusion by applying colored timed Petri nets, in which places and transition nodes represent bidding resources and activities. This work successfully dissects the collusion process, quantifies the harm of collusion, and compares the harm levels. The results of the simulation disclose two main causal factors for bidder collusion information asymmetry and strong relationship between strong bidders. This study also identifies the situations where there is a strong relationship between strong bidders. Based on these findings, several recommendations are proposed to reduce the harm of the ring game in a real reverse auction process. Thus, this study helps the buyers to take control of reverse auctions.INDEX TERMS Collusion, Petri net, reverse auction, supply chain management.

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Section: Conclusion a The Casual Factors Of Bidder Collusionsupporting

confidence: 54%

Section: B Modeling With Petri Netsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: B Modeling With Petri Netsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Hazard Analysis of Bidder Collusion in Reverse Auctions Based on Petri Nets

et al. 2020

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“…Recently, as a subfield of economics and business management, auction theory has been introduced to provide an interdisciplinary technology for radio resource allocation in the wireless systems, which can be implemented in asymmetric and incomplete information scenarios [34], [35]. To handle the problem of resource competition among selfish users via an incentive-compatible mechanism, auction theory has been widely used in wireless communications for solving the problem of maximizing utilization in the case of resource scarcity [36], [37]. One of the most applied mechanism is the sealed-bid second-price auction, also named Vickrey auction.…”

Section: B Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Auction-Based Multichannel Cooperative Spectrum Sharing in Hybrid Satellite-Terrestrial IoT Networks

Zhang

Guo

et al. 2021

IEEE Internet Things J.

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In this paper, we investigate the multi-channel cooperative spectrum sharing in hybrid satellite-terrestrial internet of things (IoT) networks with the auction mechanism, which is designed to reduce the operational expenditure of the satellitebased IoT (S-IoT) network while alleviating the spectrum scarcity issues of terrestrial-based IoT (T-IoT) network. The cluster heads of selected T-IoT networks assist the primary satellite users transmission through cooperative relaying techniques in exchange for spectrum access. We propose an auction-based optimization problem to maximize the sum transmission rate of all primary S-IoT receivers with the appropriate secondary network selection and corresponding radio resource allocation profile by the distributed implementation while meeting the minimum transmission rate of secondary receivers of each T-IoT network. Specifically, the one-shot Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction is introduced to obtain the maximum social welfare, where the winner determination problem is transformed into an assignment problem and solved by the Hungarian algorithm. To further reduce the primary satellite network decision complexity, the sequential Vickrey auction is implemented by sequential fashion until all channels are auctioned. Due to incentive compatibility with those two auction mechanisms, the secondary T-IoT cluster yields the true bids of each channel, where both the non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) and time division multiple access (TDMA) schemes are implemented in cooperative communication. Finally, simulation results validate the effectiveness and fairness of the proposed auction-based approach as well as the superiority of the NOMA scheme in secondary relays selection. Moreover, the influence of key factors on the performance of the proposed scheme is analyzed in detail.

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“…It is the auctioneer that declares winners and associated payments. Many previous CA approaches fall into the category of sealed-bid auctions and thus all need an auctioneer [18], [23], [30]- [32].…”

Section: B Related Work and Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decentralized Auctioneerless Combinatorial Auctions for Multi-Unit Resource Allocation

Yen

Sun

2019

IEEE Access

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Auction has been used to allocate resources or tasks to processes, machines, or other autonomous agents in distributed systems. Among various types of auctions, combinatorial auction (CA) allocates a bundle of items to each agent at once. Finding an optimal auction result for CA that maximizes total winning bid is NP-hard. Many time-efficient approximations to this problem work with a bid ranking function (BRF). However, the existing approximations are mostly for single-unit resource and demand an auctioneer. This paper proposes the first auctioneerless open-bid multi-unit CA (MUCA) scheme. It includes a BRF-based winner determination scheme that enables every agent to locally compute a critical bid value for it to win the MUCA and accordingly take its best response to other agent's bid and win declarations. It also allows each winner to locally compute its payment for a critical-value-based pricing scheme. We analyze stabilization, correctness, and consistency properties of the proposed approach. The simulation results confirm that the proposed approach identifies exactly the same set of winners as the centralized counterpart regardless of initial bid setting, but at the cost of the lower total winning bid and payment.

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Comparative Analysis of Sequential and Combinatorial Auctions Based on Petri Nets

Cited by 7 publications

References 65 publications

Hazard Analysis of Bidder Collusion in Reverse Auctions Based on Petri Nets

Hazard Analysis of Bidder Collusion in Reverse Auctions Based on Petri Nets

Auction-Based Multichannel Cooperative Spectrum Sharing in Hybrid Satellite-Terrestrial IoT Networks

Decentralized Auctioneerless Combinatorial Auctions for Multi-Unit Resource Allocation

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