Comparative versus contributory negligence: A comparison of the litigation expenditures

Mot, Jef De

doi:10.1016/j.irle.2012.10.001

Cited by 11 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Negligence-based liability, including contributory and comparative negligence (T. Schwartz, 1978;Parisi and Fon, 2004;P. B.…”

Section: Share Functionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Liability Design for Autonomous Vehicles and Human-Driven Vehicles: A Hierarchical Game-Theoretic Approach

Talley

2019

SSRN Journal

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Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are inevitably entering our lives with potential benefits for improved traffic safety, mobility, and accessibility. However, AVs' benefits also introduce a serious potential challenge, in the form of complex interactions with human-driven vehicles (HVs). The emergence of AVs introduces uncertainty in the behavior of human actors and in the impact of the AV manufacturer on autonomous driving design. This paper thus aims to investigate how AVs affect road safety and to design socially optimal liability rules in comparative negligence for AVs and human drivers. A unified game is developed, including a Nash game between human drivers, a Stackelberg game between the AV manufacturer and HVs, and a Stackelberg game between the law maker and other users. We also establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of the game. The game is then simulated with numerical examples to investigate the emergence of human drivers' moral hazard, the AV manufacturer's role in traffic safety, and the law maker's role in liability design. Our findings demonstrate that human drivers could develop moral hazard if they perceive their road environment has become safer and an optimal liability rule design is crucial to improve social welfare with advanced transportation technologies. More generally, the game-theoretic model developed in this paper provides an analytical tool to assist policy-makers in AV policymaking and hopefully mitigate uncertainty in the existing regulation landscape about AV technologies.

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“…Negligence-based liability, including contributory and comparative negligence (T. Schwartz, 1978;Parisi and Fon, 2004;P. B.…”

Section: Share Functionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Liability Design for Autonomous Vehicles and Human-Driven Vehicles: A Hierarchical Game-Theoretic Approach

Talley

2019

SSRN Journal

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“…In a litigated dispute parties expend resources to win or to avoid losing a case. Several contributions in the law and economics literature have framed the plaintiff's decision to file a case and the defendant's choice to defend as an endogenous decision to enter in a rentseeking game (e.g., Katz, 1988;Hirshleifer, 1989;Farmer and Pecorino, 1999;Luppi and Parisi, 2012;De Mot, 2013). Existing litigation models assume that the relative success in a lawsuit depends upon two main factors: the merits of a party's claim and the parties' litigation efforts.…”

Section: Policy Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(Lichtman and Lemley, 2007). Some previous contributions showed that the choice of the standard of proof should be based on the twofold role of evidence: truth-finding and minimization of the cost of judicial errors (e.g., Davis, 1994;Cooter and Emons, 2003;De Mot, 2013;Fluet, 2006, 2005). 17 In this paper we show that in addition to these functions, standards of proof play additional roles in civil litigation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Standards of Proof and Civil Litigation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

Guerra

Luppi

Parisi

2018

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

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In litigation models, the parties’ probability to succeed in a lawsuit hinge upon the merits of the parties’ claims and their litigation efforts. In this paper we extend this framework to consider an important procedural aspect of the legal system: the standard of proof. We recast the conventional litigation model to consider how alternative standards of proof affect litigation choices. We analyze the interrelation between different standards of proof, the effectiveness of the parties’ efforts, and the merits of the case. We study how these factors jointly affect the parties’ litigation expenditures, the selection of cases brought to the courts, pretrial bargain solutions and preemptive strategies. Our results show that standards of proof are not only instrumental to balancing the competing goals of access to justice and judicial truth-finding, but they also play a critical role in affecting parties’ litigation investments and settlement choices, and in sorting the mix of cases that will actually be filed and defended in courts. The understanding of the sorting effect of standards of proof sheds light on their role as a policy instrument in civil litigation.

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“…This is not important, because we are only interested in the relative incentives to appeal. Note further that it is uncertain whether litigation costs are necessarily larger under comparative negligence than under contributory negligence (seeDe Mot, 2013).29 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that once an issue is appealed, all issues are appealed.…”

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confidence: 99%

Appellate caseload and the switch to comparative negligence

Mot¹,

Faure

Klick

2015

International Review of Law and Economics

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Comparative versus contributory negligence: A comparison of the litigation expenditures

Cited by 11 publications

References 17 publications

Liability Design for Autonomous Vehicles and Human-Driven Vehicles: A Hierarchical Game-Theoretic Approach

Liability Design for Autonomous Vehicles and Human-Driven Vehicles: A Hierarchical Game-Theoretic Approach

Standards of Proof and Civil Litigation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

Appellate caseload and the switch to comparative negligence

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