Comparing Apples and Oranges? Leading and Misleading Uses of Historical Analogies

Abstract

Which uses of historical analogies help us compose an intelligible picture of international relations and which ones mislead us? This paper deals with this question on three levels. First, my epistemological argument makes a case for a rhetorical-pragmatist stance on historical analogies. I contend that critical discussion and adjudication make it possible to extract leads for a better understanding of the world from historical analogies. Second, my methodological argument proposes a frame of guiding questions for such discussions. These address the repertoire from which we select historical interpretations for analogies, the manner in which we interpret them, the similarities and differences between the past and present phenomena that the analogy compares, and the new insights that this comparison generates. Third, I employ these questions to put under scrutiny the historical analogies that the protagonists of the American Empire use to make their case for the supposedly benign American imperialism.

Overcoming the poverty of Western historical imagination: Alternative analogies for making sense of the South China Sea conflict

“…(Schlesinger, 1974: 444) The discipline of IR has long been fascinated with the subject of historical analogies, with extensive discussions on different ways in which historical analogies are used, both in academia and in policymaking. Many of these studies, however, are underpinned by objectivist assumptions centering around the ontological separation between historical analogies and the present-day situations to which they are applied (Khong, 1992;Kornprobst, 2007;Mumford, 2015). While this approach certainly has merits, it is incompatible with our ambition to think about the relationship more holistically, and to argue that the choice of an analogy must be contingent upon its present-day purpose and that the acting upon of the present-day situation is equally contingent upon the interpretive framework through which it is approached.…”

“…The aim of our article is to revisit the role of analogies in the study of international relations. Although critics rightly point out grave problems when analogies are employed to understand foreign policy (Goldsmith, 2005; Khong, 1992; Kornprobst, 2007; Meierhenrich, 2006; Mumford, 2015), theorizing is impossible without obtaining insights from historical analogies. As International Relations (IR) scholars are confronted with serious difficulties in conducting experiments, they can hardly do without relying on the lessons of the past.…”

What is historical sociology?

“…The existence of these two generic tendencies -history as scripture and as butterfly -is forged by the working practices of IR scholarship itself. Most mainstream approaches adopt a form of "history as scripture", using history in order to code findings, mine data or as a source of post factum explanations (Isacoff 2002;Kornprobst 2007). Most post-positivist approaches -particularly postmodernism -assume a form of the latter, using history as a means to disrupt prevalent powerknowledge nexuses (e.g.…”

New Imperialism: Toward a Holistic Approach

“…Rather, for skeptics, the extent of historical difference and novelty that is attributed to contemporary imperial practice is considered to be grossly overstated, with the anti‐imperialist ethos of the United States considered little more than a rhetorical illusion designed to mask more generic imperial ambitions and practices. As Kornprobst (:43–46) observes, advocates of benign imperialism ignore “the dark sides of empire” (namely exploitation, oppression, and death), this being merely “part of a long tradition of imperialist literature that aims to justify and glorify the allegedly noble role of the metropolis” (also see Caldwell ). In common with economic accounts of new imperialism, a common theme among sceptics is that the primary objective of the United States in recent years has been to sustain its international position in the face of relative decline via the adoption of strategic methods (especially the use of force) designed to ensure control over global oil supplies and to secure leverage over its main challengers and rivals (see Magdoff and Foster ; Eland ; Klare ; Pilger ; Foster ; Johnson ; Pieterse ).…”