Comparison of Cost Allocation Strategies among Prosumers and Consumers in a Cooperative Game

Abstract

As the higher penetration of distributed generation (DG) and electrical energy storage (EES) is emerging, end-users are taking a more active role in the power grid. With an increased amount of DG and EES available, opportunities for cooperation in the operation of power exchange arises. In cooperative game theory, for all players in a game cooperate under joint benefits. Preliminary studies show such cooperation among prosumers and consumers provides reduced annual electricity cost compared to independent operation. Focusing on cost allocation among endusers equipped with rooftop PV and batteries, we want to evaluate two solution concepts from game theory; the nucleolus and the Shapley value. By changing parameters that increase the value of the battery system in terms of reduced cost, this paper aims to examine whether the deviation between the cost allocations proposed by the methods increases as the value of the battery system is changed. The simulated case is based on data from private residences in Norway. Results from our case show that both nucleolus and Shapley provide stable cost allocations under minor deviations. However, results also imply that the deviation between the methods increases with an increased battery system value.

Modelling and Optimization of Power Allocation and Benefit Sharing in a Local Energy Community

“…Then, we can obtain the collective surplus as the difference between collective production and self-consumed energy from the community as in (7). This collective surplus is then assigned to each producer based on the prorate of individual production, which represents the energy exported to the grid, (8). Finally, the net production exported to the community is computed with (9).…”

“…A common aspect of EC that are also being looked into is the fairness of the allocation. To ensure some fairness between members, the application of game theory has been showing promising results to develop a cooperative framework [7,8]. However, the computational time could be unacceptable since every possible combinations of community needs to be run in order to compute the marginal value/benefit brought by every single member.…”

A two-stage management strategy for the optimal operation and billing in an energy community with collective self-consumption

“…Maximum charge and discharge rate are ensured with (20) and the bounds of state of charge (SoC) with (21). The SoC computation accounts for charge and discharge efficiencies following (22). Besides, ( 23) and (24) set the SoC values at the beginning and the end of the simulated time horizon, respectively.…”

“…The study in [18] proposed that the energy allocation should be performed on a yearly basis to ensure that each member receives the same share. In order to ensure fairness between members, the application of game theory on cooperative frame-work has been widely used -through the concept of Shapley value that is based on the estimation of the individual contribution of each player taken independently [21,22].…”

Economic and Climatic Impacts of Different Peer-to-Peer Game Theoretic–Based Energy Trading Systems

“…In cooperative game theory, every player contributes to a common goal by forming a coalition [33]. In literature, multiple part game [37], non-cooperative game [38] and shapley values-based cooperative game [39] are used for inter-trading and to minimize the dissatisfaction levels of game players. In the proposed model, the coalitionbased game theory with super additive property is used for various peer-to-peer energy trading systems to improve users' participation which will finally leads towards a grand coalition.…”