Compatibility in tax reporting

Criminal Justice Review

Aransiola

2021

This study investigates the differences observed in the rate of tax evasion between the Global North and South countries, with special focus on Brazil, by comparing key parameters of their tax systems, namely, tax burden, audit cost, and fines. This is achieved by extending and applying Graetz, Reinganun, and Wilde’s model using data from tax authorities from European and Latin American countries, which produced parameters that are used for Bayesian games. The results show that tax evasion is directly associated with tax burden and audit cost, but the effect of fines is unclear. Overall, findings pointed to shortcomings in the tax system of Latin American countries that create the avenue for high tax evasion.

Section: Research Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Many studies uphold the effect of fines in dissuading tax evasion, that is, the application of high fines increases the cost of evasion and, thus, reduces the rate of evasion (Bayer & Cowell, 2009; Lipatov, 2006). Studies have also found that the effect of the fines depends crucially on the accounting standard adopted by the agents.…”

Section: Research Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Brazilian Evidence on Tax Evasion and Enforcement: A Case Study of Global North–South Comparison

Criminal Justice Review

Aransiola

2021

“…Mais uma vez pode-se auferir a baixa correlação entre os percentuais de multas aplicados pelos órgãos fiscalizadores e a sonegação fiscal. Mostrando possíveis interações entre agentes sonegadores, Lipatov (2006) evidenciou que o efeito dos percentuais de multas dependerá crucialmente do padrão contábil 1113 adotado pelos agentes. Se o padrão contábil escolhido for do tipo agressive, 1 2 14 o aumento no percentual de multas pode ter efeito adverso na fiscalização.…”

Section: Gráfico 1 -Relação Entre T E H -L Dos Países Selecionadosunclassified

“…Embora as informações sejam restritas, ampliar os grupos de países estudados pode fornecer informações de maior robustez para os parâmetros. Como sugestão para trabalhos futuros, recomenda-se utilizar as extensões aos modelos Lipatov (2006;, juntamente com os dados disponíveis e realizar o estudo de forma empírica.…”

Section: Considerações Finaisunclassified

“…O modelo passou a envolver os contribuintes, o fisco e os parâmetros que podem influenciar nas decisões dos agentes, permitindo, assim, análises empíricas e voltadas para analisar a eficiência das políticas. Entretanto, poucos estudos empí-ricos (ver Andreoni et al 1998;Lipatov 2005Lipatov , 2006 são observados na literatura, pois limitam-se apenas ao desenvolvimento no campo teórico. Isso pode mostrar a necessidade de estudos que verifiquem a robustez dos parâmetros nos estudos empíricos.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

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Evidências internacionais de sonegação fiscal: uma análise a partir do modelo de Graetz, Reinganun e Wilde

2017

Estud. Econ.

ResumoO propósito desse artigo é parametrizar o modelo seminal de Graetz, Reinganun e Wilde (1986) para dois grupos de países: G1 com baixa evasão fiscal e G2 com alta evasão fiscal. Os principais resultados mostram uma forte correlação entre a carga tributária, o custo de fiscalizar e a evasão fiscal dos países. A multa parece ter pouca eficácia na mitigação da sonegação. Os resultados possuem implicações tanto do ponto de vista teórico quanto prático. Este é o primeiro estudo que se parametriza o modelo de Graetz, Reinganun e Wilde como forma de explanar a diversidade da evasão fiscal internacional e desenvolver uma estrutura internacional de conformidade fiscal. Assim, políticas que revisem a estrutura fiscal dos países bem como modernizem os órgãos fiscalizadores de forma a reduzir os seus custos, poderão ter efeitos positivos sobre a evasão de impostos. Palavras-ChaveSonegação fiscal. Teoria dos Jogos. Evidências internacionais. AbstractWe propose to parameterize Graetz, Reinganun and Wilde's seminal model (1986) for two countries groups: G1 with low tax evasion and G2 with high tax evasion. Based on data from 16 countries, we find a strong correlation between tax burden, inspecting cost and countries' tax evasion. Fine seems to have lack of effectiveness in mitigation of evasion. Our results have implications for both research and practice. This is the first study to parametrize Graetz, Reinganun and Wilde's model as an explanator of international tax evasion diversity and serves as the starting point for the development of an international tax compliance framework. Thus, policies that review the countries' tax structure and modernize regulatory agencies to reduce their costs may have positive effects on tax evasion.

Tax evasion in Brazil: the case of specialists

2018

JES

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to use the instrumental game theory to understand the behavior of the front agents tax evasion and tax authority in Brazil. Design/methodology/approach In order to analyze the taxpayer’s behavior before the Brazilian tax system and tax actions aimed at reducing tax evasion, the authors developed a theoretical model based on the payoffs of Graetz et al. (1986) and increased with situations proposed by Siqueira (2004), Lipatov (2006) and Oliveira (2011). Findings Considering the cases with and without specialists, the main results show that in high dropout situation, penalize taxpayers with high fines or deprivations of liberty may not be as effective. Another result of the analysis is that the audit and inspection costs played an important role in driving the equilibrium system. Research limitations/implications One limitation of this study is to consider how the exogenous tax authorities earnings (Federal Revenue of Brazil and Federal Police) and not as a function of the goals and certain enforcement policies for each public body. Practical implications The authors suggest the following policy: investing in tax inspectors and unbureaucratic the authorities of the cost structure become a more effective tool to combat non-compliance with tax obligations that the intensity of the penalties imposed by the act of evading. Originality/value This paper contributes to the literature insofar as it models for the first time, using game theory, the behavior of the evading agent and the tax authority in Brazil.