Compensation for Damages Caused by Nuclear Accidents: A Convention as Insurance

Faure, Michael; Skogh, Göran

doi:10.1057/gpp.1992.37

Cited by 44 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…As stated in Faure and Skogh (1992), the cap will be increased to h700 million when the 2004 Protocols are implemented in the States Parties to the Paris and Brussels Conventions. 14 Carrez (2003).…”

Section: The Nuclear Insurance Market In Francementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The members' level of care allows us to compare their risk by observing their individual actions taken to prevent accidents. 50 Faure and Skogh (1992). 51 Some European countries, such as Germany, have already implemented unlimited civil liability for their nuclear operators.…”

Section: Criteria To Differentiate Riskmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For further details, see Spadaro and Rabl (1998) and Schieber and Schneider (2002). 4 Faure and Skogh (1992).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Coverage of the Nuclear Risk in Europe: Which Alternative?

Faure

Fiore²

2008

Geneva Pap Risk Insur Issues Pract

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The coverage of catastrophic risks, and in particular of industrial and technological risks, raises multiple questions. As nuclear risk is considered to be a special risk, its coverage is not provided in a traditional way. One of the problems in coverage of the nuclear risk is that operators today still to a large extent rely upon insurers. However, nuclear insurance is provided through national pools that operate on a non-competitive basis. These pools are costly for operators and the damage covered remains insufficient. Given their dissatisfaction with these insurance pools, many nuclear operators are now looking for alternatives. Relying on the previous work of Faure and Skogh, the goal of this paper is to examine whether a risk-sharing by nuclear operators could constitute a serious alternative for the current coverage system. In order to examine this alternative we will place it in a concrete context of nuclear operators in Europe. Moreover, we do not merely want to sketch the theoretical possibilities of a risk-sharing by operators (as this has been done before in the literature). We will in addition also examine the financial consequences for nuclear operators in Europe of such a risk-sharing agreement.

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Section: The Nuclear Insurance Market In Francementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Criteria To Differentiate Riskmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Coverage of the Nuclear Risk in Europe: Which Alternative?

Faure

Fiore²

2008

Geneva Pap Risk Insur Issues Pract

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“…Regarding the European experience, the Directive "on Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage" 16 states that "The prevention and remedying of environmental damage should be implemented through the furtherance of the 'polluter pays' principle', as indicated in the Treaty and in line with the 11 See Ringleb and Wiggins (1990). 12 The Superfund allows decontaminating the sites included in a national list, the National Priority List (NPL), with money being primarily collected from taxes on oil and oil-derived products.…”

Section: Traditional Liability Insurancementioning

confidence: 99%

The Efficient Liability Sharing Factor for Environmental Disasters: Lessons for Optimal Insurance Regulation

Boyer

Porrini

2008

SSRN Journal

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“…According to the Ferguson-Anderson Act of 1988, mandatory risksharing exists in the U.S., covering third-party liability up to $9 billion. Faure and Skogh (1992) have outlined a hypothetical European risk-sharing agreement covering nuclear power third-party liability one hundred times larger than today that would make compensations possible also for very large accidents and would create a joint interest in the industry for mutual control. However, the solution requires agreements by states and by plant owners that are unequal in many respects.…”

Section: New Industrial Hazardsmentioning

confidence: 99%