2022
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.4043
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Competition and Agency Problems Within Banks: Evidence from Insider Lending

Abstract: This paper studies whether greater competition can mitigate agency problems within banks. We measure the intensity of the agency conflict within a bank by the volume of loans that the bank lends to its insiders (e.g., executives). We first check that these loans are a form of private benefit. By exploiting interstate branching deregulation, we then show that banks react to greater competition by reducing insider lending, especially when the entry of new competitors may more strongly affect bank profitability. … Show more

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Cited by 10 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…The agency theory has been widely used in banking research to explain excessive risk-taking behavior by bank managers for speculation, hedging, competition and incentives (Boyd and DE Nicoló, 2005; Girotti & Salvadè, 2022; Minhat & Abdullah, 2016). Using the lens of the agency theory, Galdi, De Moura, and França (2021) explained earnings management in Brazilian banks using LLPs, while AlQudah, Azzam, Haija, and AlSmadi (2020) explained the monitoring role of diverse ownership structures in mitigating earnings management in Jordanian banks.…”
Section: Background and Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The agency theory has been widely used in banking research to explain excessive risk-taking behavior by bank managers for speculation, hedging, competition and incentives (Boyd and DE Nicoló, 2005; Girotti & Salvadè, 2022; Minhat & Abdullah, 2016). Using the lens of the agency theory, Galdi, De Moura, and França (2021) explained earnings management in Brazilian banks using LLPs, while AlQudah, Azzam, Haija, and AlSmadi (2020) explained the monitoring role of diverse ownership structures in mitigating earnings management in Jordanian banks.…”
Section: Background and Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Jensen and Meckling (1976) posited that managers are willing to embark on a growth strategy by increasing risk, but shareholders wish to minimize risk to protect their stock from declining in value. In the case of the banking sector, agency problems exist between shareholders and bank managers (Girotti and Salvadè 2021). Girotti and Salvadè (2021) proxied agency conflicts in banks by giving insiders preferences in obtaining loans.…”
Section: Hypotheses and Conceptual Model Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the case of the banking sector, agency problems exist between shareholders and bank managers (Girotti and Salvadè 2021). Girotti and Salvadè (2021) proxied agency conflicts in banks by giving insiders preferences in obtaining loans. Alternatively, managers of banks may take risky decisions to increase their private benefits.…”
Section: Hypotheses and Conceptual Model Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Girotti and Salvadè (2022) show an important positive feature of bank competition: a reduction on managerial self-dealing due higher competition.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%