2001
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-6245(01)00044-0
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Competition and compatibility among Internet Service Providers

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Cited by 63 publications
(49 citation statements)
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“…Two-sided markets are usually investigated using Hotelling's localization model of [12], which has been widely applied in the literature and contextualized in the digital market. For example, Foros and Hansen analyse the competition between two ISPs operating in the same geographical area in order to determine the quality of interconnection [13]. A large strand of literature refers the two-sided market framework and the Hotelling model in order to compare ISPs and CPs, under the net neutrality debate, which is a policy issue that has the potential to modify the dynamics of accessing online content [14].…”
Section: The Vod Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Two-sided markets are usually investigated using Hotelling's localization model of [12], which has been widely applied in the literature and contextualized in the digital market. For example, Foros and Hansen analyse the competition between two ISPs operating in the same geographical area in order to determine the quality of interconnection [13]. A large strand of literature refers the two-sided market framework and the Hotelling model in order to compare ISPs and CPs, under the net neutrality debate, which is a policy issue that has the potential to modify the dynamics of accessing online content [14].…”
Section: The Vod Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Though the question of how peering can be established in an economically optimal manner has attracted considerable interest (for example, [5,8,11,15,18]), there have been very few studies [39] that address the optimal design of interconnection contracts using actual network engineering parameters, such as average traffic flows at various interconnection points [1]. We believe that the inclusion of operational aspects is essential in grounding the interconnection contracts in reality.…”
Section: Motivationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hence, they analyze a capacity constrained price game as a one-stage Cournot game. Foros and Hansen (2001) analyze the incentives to be compatible if the downstream firms compete a la Hotelling. In a model without 4 without loss of generality we shall assume that firm 1 possibly has a larger installed base than firm 2, i.e., β 1 ≥ β 2 .…”
Section: The Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%