Competition and partnership between conformity and payoff-based imitations in social dilemmas

Abstract

Learning from a partner who collects a higher payoff is a frequently used working hypothesis in evolutionary game theory. One of the alternative dynamical rules is when the focal player prefers to follow the strategy choice of the majority in the local neighborhood, which is often called a conformity-driven strategy update. In this work we assume that both strategy learning methods are present and compete for space within the framework of a coevolutionary model. Our results reveal that the presence of a payoff-driven strategy learning method becomes exclusive for high sucker's payoff and/or high temptation values that represent a snowdrift game dilemma situation. In general, however, the competition of the mentioned strategy learning methods could be useful to enlarge the parameter space where only cooperators prevail. The success of cooperation is based on the enforced coordination of cooperator players which reveals the benefit of the latter strategy. Interestingly, the payoff-based and the conformity-based cooperator players can form an effective alliance against defectors that can also extend the parameter space of full cooperator solution in the stag-hunt game region. Our work highlights that the coevolution of strategies and individual features such as the learning method can provide a novel type of pattern formation mechanism that cannot be observed in a static model, and hence remains hidden in traditional models.

Evolutionary dynamics of networked multi-person games: mixing opponent-aware and opponent-independent strategy decisions

“…Most existing studies in setting how individuals make strategic decisions, normally, take a homogeneous hypothesis that all agents update strategies in the same way [3,4,39,43]. Even if when consolidating two distinct decision modes, the heterogeneity is mainly concentrated on the onefold information source or decision manner [27][28][29][30]. Given the diversity and self-organization of individual interaction [18,31], however, it is not unreasonable to predict that both heterogeneities can dramatically affect the evolutionary outcomes.…”

“…For instance, aspirationbased rules can give rise to intrinsically different properties compared with imitation-based rules [15,24,25], and such an effect also holds between the death-birth rule and the birth-death rule [19,26]. In particular, the hybrid dynamics of mixing two or multiple decision-making rules [27][28][29][30] have attracted tremendous interest recently, given the diversity and heterogeneity of human interactions [18,31,32]. Due to a large number of potential combinations, a complete exploration of these systems is a highly difficult and even impossible task.…”

“…Due to a large number of potential combinations, a complete exploration of these systems is a highly difficult and even impossible task. This difficulty, nevertheless, can be solved by introducing the co-evolutionary dynamics generated by strategy evolution and rule learning [27,30,[33][34][35], which often provide us with some novel insights into the agents' decision-making. Yet, most of these studies are concentrated on agent-based simulations or behavioural experiments in the context of two-person games, and meanwhile analytical investigations are scarce.…”

Mobility restores the mechanism which supports cooperation in the voluntary prisoner’s dilemma game

“…Despite the very recent introduction of the VPD game in a diluted network with a purely random mobility scenario [47], many questions regarding the impact of mobility, in both the sustenance of biodiversity and the potential for widespread cooperation, remain unanswered. For instance, given the recent advances in the understanding of coevolutionary models [48][49][50][51][52][53][54], what happens to the population when considering agent mobility in a coevolutionary fashion? Thus, without loss of generality, this research introduces the VPD game with a coevolutionary model where not only the agents' strategies but also their movement is subject to the evolutionary process, which provides a more realistic representation of mobility within the domain of voluntary/optional participation.…”

Evolution of cooperation in synergistically evolving dynamic interdependent networks: fundamental advantages of coordinated network evolution

“…Myriad mechanisms such as kin selection [5,6], punishment [7][8][9][10] and voluntary participation [11] are proposed to rescue such cooperation tragedy in this spectrum (see review [12,13]). In particular, by taking into account the following aspects, the recent shift from evolutionary games in well-mixed populations [14][15][16] and static networks [17][18][19][20][21][22][23] to evolutionary games in multiplex networks [24][25][26][27] and dynamic networks [28][29][30][31][32][33][34] has stimulated mounting efforts in exploring cooperation dynamics in more realistic scenarios (see review [35][36][37][38]).…”