2009
DOI: 10.1007/s11129-009-9050-7
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Competition and price discrimination in the market for mailing lists

Abstract: This paper examines whether mailing list sellers, when faced with additional competitors, are more likely to try to segment consumers by offering additional choices at different prices (second-degree price discrimination) and/or offering different prices to readily identifiable groups of consumers (third-degree price discrimination). We utilize a dataset that includes information about all consumer response lists derived from mail order buyers (i.e. lists derived from catalogs) available for rental in 1997 and… Show more

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Cited by 24 publications
(17 citation statements)
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References 35 publications
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“…good case, they show that …rms set one cost-based tari¤ for each good and o¤er a lump-sum discount to consumers who buy both goods 6 .…”
Section: Mussa and Rosen 1978 And Maskin And Riley 1984) Consumers Amentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…good case, they show that …rms set one cost-based tari¤ for each good and o¤er a lump-sum discount to consumers who buy both goods 6 .…”
Section: Mussa and Rosen 1978 And Maskin And Riley 1984) Consumers Amentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, Bonatti (2011) lets buyers with stronger brand preferences also have stronger vertical 6 Speci…cally, the two goods i = 1; 2, have symmetric marginal costs, ci. Consumers again exhibit independent horizontal and vertical heterogeneity, but horizontal heterogeneity is now expanded to include an independent location parameter for each good, fx1; x2g.…”
Section: Independent Heterogeneitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Johnson and Myatt (2003) demonstrate such a trade-off in a theory paper. In the price discrimination literature, Seim and Viard (2004) demonstrate that competition can increase the number of calling plans offered by phone companies, whereas Borzekowski et al (2009) find that competition leads mailing-list companies to offer more versions of their products.…”
Section: Competition Factorsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Johnson and Myatt (2003) demonstrate such a tradeoff in a theory paper. In the price discrimination literature, Seim and Viard (2004) demonstrate that competition can increase the number of calling plans offered by phone companies, while Borzekowski, Thomadsen and Taragin (2008) find that competition leads mailing list companies to offer more versions of their products.…”
Section: Competition Factorsmentioning
confidence: 99%