Competition and price strategies of hazardous waste collection for small and micro enterprises based on dual-channel reverse supply chain

Zhang, Mengyao; Wang, Yao; Qian, Xinwu; Zhao, Jun; Nie, Yong; Qian, Guangren

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2022.135714

Cited by 11 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…This would prevent subsidies from being the only link between the government and waste disposal institutions. This result is consistent with those reported by Zhang et al [95] and Sun et al [36], who verified the role of reducing the operating costs of the supply chain in improving the value of the coordination in the WSC. Furthermore, our results show that reducing the operating costs of the supply chain and improving the value of waste recycling complement each other and imply specific measures of implementation.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 93%

Identifying Waste Supply Chain Coordination Barriers with Fuzzy MCDM

2023

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The stability and efficiency of the waste supply chain (WSC) is related to the urban environment. This study constructed a framework of barriers to coordinating the WSC based on four perspectives: the costs and benefits, mechanisms involved, behaviors of the subjects, and technologies and standards used. We used an analytic network process based on the fuzzy decision-making trial and evaluation laboratory to calculate the centrality and weight of each barrier factor, and we determined the critical barriers to coordination by combining their results. A causality diagram of the barriers was drawn, and a scheme of coordination of the WSC was designed based on a closed-loop supply chain around the critical barriers. The results show that contradictions in benefits between subjects, contradictions between economic and social benefits, excessive subsidies, the failure of the market mechanism, the lack of a mechanism for supervision, and blocked information and distrust among the subjects are the five most critical barriers to the coordination of the WSC, with excessive subsidies the root cause of the lack of coordination. The subsidy for direct waste disposal should be used to reduce the cost of the operation of the WSC, waste recycling should be improved, an information-sharing platform should be built, and the cost of recyclable waste for manufacturers should be reduced to improve the efficiency of the WSC.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 93%

Identifying Waste Supply Chain Coordination Barriers with Fuzzy MCDM

2023

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“…Chang et al [65] explored the effect of government subsidies for recycling and remanufacturing with taxation. Afterward, Zhang et al [66] investigated the role of strict government supervision in effectively recycling hazardous waste.…”

Section: Consumer Behavior In the Reverse Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Recycling Pricing and Government Subsidy Strategy for End-of-Life Vehicles in a Reverse Supply Chain under Consumer Recycling Channel Preferences

Wang

2023

Mathematics

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In the existing recycling system for end-of-life vehicles (ELVs), online recycling based on the Internet platform is a useful supplement. In this paper, a Stackelberg game pricing model, which is dominated by ELV part remanufacturers and composed of remanufacturers, recyclers, and consumers, is constructed considering consumer preferences for recycling channels. The influence of different subsidy strategies on the optimal pricing, profit, and recycling volume of the reverse supply chain (RSC) of ELVs is discussed, and the effects of factors such as subsidy amount and consumer preferences on the RSC of ELVs are analyzed using numerical simulation. The results show that the increase in consumers’ online recycling preferences has a positive effect on the recycling volume and profit of the RSC of ELVs. Considering the recycling volume of the RSC, when fewer subsidies are given, more recycling volume can be generated by subsidizing remanufacturers, and, on the contrary, recycling volume will be generated by subsidizing consumers. Considering the profit of the RSC, when subsidies are given at the lower-middle level, higher profits can be earned by subsidizing remanufacturers, and, on the contrary, higher profits can be earned by subsidizing consumers.

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