Competition between Adaptive Agents: Learning and Collective Efficiency

Challet, Damien

doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-8909-3_5

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“…Both are examples of large scale distributed coordination problems that study competing agents employing adaptive strategies with limited learning. [17].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self-organization in a distributed coordination game through heuristic rules

2016

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In this paper we consider a distributed coordination game played by a large number of agents with finite information sets, which characterizes emergence of a single dominant attribute out of a large number of competitors. Formally, N agents play a coordination game repeatedly which has exactly N Nash equilibria and all of the equlibria are equally preferred by the agents. The problem is to select one equilibrium out of N possible equilibria in the least number of attempts. We propose a number of heuristic rules based on reinforcement learning to solve the coordination problem. We see that the agents self-organize into clusters with varying intensities depending on the heuristic rule applied although all clusters but one are transitory in most cases. Finally, we characterize a trade-off in terms of the time requirement to achieve a degree of stability in strategies and the efficiency of such a solution.

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“…Both are examples of large scale distributed coordination problems that study competing agents employing adaptive strategies with limited learning. [17].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%