Competition in Defense Acquisitions

Gansler, Jacques S.; Lucyshyn, William; Arendt, Michael

doi:10.21236/ada529406

Cited by 5 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Credibility frequently requires redundancy: maintaining alternative potential intermediaries to credibly threaten existing ones with dismissal, as the US government has done with defense contractors (Gansler et al . ). Governments can reduce these costs by relying on a single contractor, but dependence may make it impracticable to dismiss that contractor even if it underperforms.…”

Section: Trading Control For Competencementioning

confidence: 97%

Competence versus control: The governor's dilemma

Abbott

Genschel

Snidal

et al. 2019

Regulation & Governance

103

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Most governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. Principal-agent theory views indirect governance primarily as a problem of information: the agent has an informational advantage over the principal, which it can exploit to evade principal control. But indirect governance creates a more fundamental problem of power. Competent intermediaries with needed expertise, credibility, legitimacy, and/or operational capacity are inherently difficult to control because the policy benefits they can create (or the trouble they can cause) give them leverage. Conversely, tight governor control constrains intermediaries. The governor thus faces a dilemma: emphasizing control limits intermediary competence and risks policy failure; emphasizing intermediary competence risks control failure. This "governor's dilemma" helps to explain puzzling features of indirect governance: why it is not limited to principal-agent delegation but takes multiple forms; why governors choose forms that appear counterproductive in an informational perspective; and why arrangements are frequently unstable.

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Section: Trading Control For Competencementioning

confidence: 97%

Competence versus control: The governor's dilemma

Abbott

Genschel

Snidal

et al. 2019

Regulation & Governance

103

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“…According to Gansler, Lucyshyn, and Arendt (2009), competition is important for the DOD because it can aid in increasing economic efficiency, innovation, quality, and performance.…”

Section: Contractor Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

What are the Effects of Protest Fear?

Calandruccio¹,

Colbert²,

Combs³

2014

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Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Fear of the real or perceived consequences of receiving a bid protest exists. U.S. Navy contracting officers have some concern of protests. This concern can be linked to certain consequences on acquisition strategies. There is enough qualitative and quantitative empirical evidence to suggest that fear of protest can impact what would otherwise be prudent business decisions. The greatest concerns are a few instances of inappropriate uses of lowest price technically acceptable and the reduced technical evaluation effectiveness attributed to fear of protests. If fear waters down the source selection hindering its ability to distinguish between the true value of offers, then contracting officers must ask themselves why go through the trouble of a best-value source selection? Could contracting officers simply award to the low bidder? To what extent is the set of stringent source selection rules driving the acquisition team to this result by default (i.e., regardless of source selection method actually employed)? Thus, for the sake of stringent, fairnessbased rules, contracted outcomes can be compromised. Whether the tradeoff is prudent remains to be determined. Further research is needed to ascertain these other culprits, then compare the relative effects of fear of protest among other factors. SUBJECT TERMS

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“…In fact, there is no reason to limit competition to the development phase. Rather, competition can also be used during the production phase in order to speed delivery, reduce costs, and encourage further innovation (Gansler, Lucyshyn, & Arendt, 2009). In the absence of competition, production efforts can often last for decades, with little incentive to increase efficiency.…”

Section: Competitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cost as a Military Requirement

Gansler¹,

Lucyshyn²

2013

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Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

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Competition in Defense Acquisitions

Cited by 5 publications

References 12 publications

Competence versus control: The governor's dilemma

Competence versus control: The governor's dilemma

What are the Effects of Protest Fear?

Cost as a Military Requirement

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