Competition in mechanisms

Pai, Mallesh M.

doi:10.1145/1980534.1980541

Cited by 8 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…A recent survey by Pai [26] highlights settings where different sellers compete by announcing mechanisms, starting from the seminal work of McAfee [23] and focusing on revenue maximization. Our work is in the same spirit, and aims to analyze the effect of such competition on social welfare.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Definition A. 26 We say that the click through rates are separable, when aij = αj γi for all i and j, that is, the click through rate is the product of a factor depending on the slot and a factor depending on the advertiser.…”

Section: A31 Per-click Valuationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…x:x j =x * j ax ≥ 1 for all j ∈ [m] (26) ax ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X By the property of β-fractionally subaddtive valuations, since the set of feasible solutions to the above linear program, constitutes a fractional cover of x * we know that βV (x * ) ≥ v(x * ). In addition we know that we can achieve v(x * ) by just setting ax * = 1 and ax = 0 for any other x ∈ X .…”

Section: Omitted Proofs C1 Section 3: Hierarchy Of Valuationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Composable and efficient mechanisms

Syrgkanis

Tardos

2013

Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

182

406

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We initiate the study of efficient mechanism design with guaranteed good properties even when players participate in multiple different mechanisms simultaneously or sequentially. We define the class of smooth mechanisms, related to smooth games defined by Roughgarden, that can be thought of as mechanisms that generate approximately market clearing prices. We show that smooth mechanisms result in high quality outcome in equilibrium both in the full information setting and in the Bayesian setting with uncertainty about participants, as well as in learning outcomes. Our main result is to show that such mechanisms compose well: smoothness locally at each mechanism implies efficiency globally.For mechanisms where good performance requires that bidders do not bid above their value, we identify the notion of a weakly smooth mechanism. Weakly smooth mechanisms, such as the Vickrey auction, are approximately efficient under the no-overbidding assumption. Similar to smooth mechanisms, weakly smooth mechanisms behave well in composition, and have high quality outcome in equilibrium (assuming no overbidding) both in the full information setting and in the Bayesian setting, as well as in learning outcomes.In most of the paper we assume participants have quasilinear valuations. We also extend some of our results to settings where participants have budget constraints.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A31 Per-click Valuationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Omitted Proofs C1 Section 3: Hierarchy Of Valuationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Composable and efficient mechanisms

Syrgkanis

Tardos

2013

Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

182

406

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“…These models vary with regard to the assumed market size (e.g., large finite markets, infinite markets, or two-auctioneer markets), bidder information regarding valuations when choosing an auctioneer, the available auction formats, and whether items are sold in sequential, overlapping, or simultaneous auctions (see McAfee 1993, Peters 1997, Peters and Severinov 1997, Burguet and Sakovics 1999, Parlane 2008, Bapna et al 2009, Virág 2010, Albrecht et al 2012, Kim and Kircher 2015, Truong et al 2017. For a survey of work in this literature up until 2010, see Pai (2010).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competing Combinatorial Auctions

Kittsteiner

Ott

Steinberg

2022

Information Systems Research

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Combinatorial auctions are auctions in which bids can be submitted on sets of items, rather than just on individual items. These auctions are generally beneficial to both auctioneers and bidders, as they allow bidders to express their synergies for sets of items. In recent years, we have seen the advent of combinatorial auctions as well as the emergence of online market platforms with competing auctioneers. However, combinatorial auctions have largely been absent from these platforms. Our article provides an explanation for this absence by demonstrating that competition between auctioneers can reduce the attractiveness of offering combinatorial auctions. Specifically, we show that auctioneers can limit competitive pressure between themselves by allowing bids only on specific packages, where these packages differ between auctioneers. This results in market segmentation, which increases bidder competition, and consequently increases auctioneer revenues. These findings have implications for market design. In particular they imply that, for an online market platform having multiple sellers offering auctions to the same set of buyers, it might not be advantageous to offer combinatorial auctions as a design option to the competing sellers.

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“…The frictional matching process distinguishes the study from the directed search literature that studies competing sellers who simultaneously announce mechanisms to attract buyers who can choose which mechanism to participate in. In equilibrium, with mild technical conditions, each seller runs an auction with a reserve price lower than the Myerson (1981) reserve price (Burguet and Sákovics, 1999;Pai, 2009Pai, , 2010, and as the number of sellers approaches infinity, the equilibrium mechanism is the efficient auction (McAfee, 1993;Peters and Severinov, 1997). Although the literature yields beautiful technical results, it is hardly applicable to the real world: Not all agents can meet one another because of geographic or time constraints, and a lower reserve price may be a result of buyers' sequential opportunities rather than a tool to attract buyer participation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Prices versus auctions in large markets

Zhang

2020

Econ Theory

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This paper studies the use of posted prices versus auctions in a large dynamic market with many short-lived sellers and long-lived buyers. Although a reserve-price auction maximizes the expected revenue, the optimal revenue decreases when the market becomes more buyerfriendly; namely, when buyers survive longer, face fewer competitors, and become more patient. As the market becomes more buyer-friendly, the revenue advantage from a reserve-price auction over posting a price reduces, but using posted prices would lead to sale and allocative inefficiencies.

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Competition in mechanisms

Cited by 8 publications

References 7 publications

Composable and efficient mechanisms

Composable and efficient mechanisms

Competing Combinatorial Auctions

Prices versus auctions in large markets

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