2018
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3113746
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Competition in the Venture Capital Market and the Success of Startup Companies: Theory and Evidence

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Cited by 2 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…traditional argument is that investors need equity to have incentives for providing more valueadding services. This is typically modelled as a two-sided moral hazard problem (see, e.g., Da Rin et al 2012, andSerfes, Hong, andThiele (2018)). The reason for using equity in our model is also related to incentives, but not to moral hazard.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…traditional argument is that investors need equity to have incentives for providing more valueadding services. This is typically modelled as a two-sided moral hazard problem (see, e.g., Da Rin et al 2012, andSerfes, Hong, andThiele (2018)). The reason for using equity in our model is also related to incentives, but not to moral hazard.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%