Competition over More Than One Prize

Clark, Derek J.; Riis, Christian

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_44

Cited by 125 publications

(113 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…In particular, the supports need not be intervals and may differ across players. 4 A notable exception is Parreiras and Rubinchik's (2010) characterization of some equilibrium properties of a multiplayer asymmetric all-pay auction with independent private values.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations

Siegel

2014

Journal of Economic Theory

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations

Siegel

2014

Journal of Economic Theory

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“…37 For example Clark and Riis (1998) consider the case of a multi-prize contest with symmetric contestants. Their main interest is aggregate effort, and they find that highest aggregate effort requires to award only one prize.…”

Section: Proposition 12 Let π(T(i) T ) Be a Zero-homogeneous Csf Ifmentioning

confidence: 99%

Distributional Comparative Statics with Heterogeneous Agents

Hefti

2016

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We propose a formal way to systematically study the differential effects of exogenous shocks in economic models with heterogeneous agents. Our setting applies to models that can be rephrased as "competition for market shares" in a broad sense. We show that even in presence of any number of arbitrarily heterogeneous agents, a single recursion relation characterizes the distributional pattern of equilibrium market shares and related measures. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayWe identify the general conditions under which the market share function rotates, thereby either causing more or less equality among the agents. Our setting highlights the exceptional rule that power functions play for the distributional effects. We apply our method across economic models, including examples from monopolistic competition, discrete choice, partial and general equilibrium theory and contest theory.JEL Classification: D72; D82; C73; C62; C65

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“…The lobbyists compete in bribing the politician. This setting has been generalized by Clark and Riis (1998) for multiple prizes. This is equivalent to the present situation where two firms compete for the same customers but one (the incumbent) is restricted by the uniform pricing and the coverage constraint.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Liberalization of the Postal Service Market in Europe: Entry with Universal Service and Partial Coverage

Beschorner

2008

SSRN Journal

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp08122.pdf Non-technical SummaryIn the advent of postal market liberalization in several European countries this analysis provides an understanding in which dimensions entering firms will compete with the incumbent and how incumbents may act when they anticipate entry. These insights are valuable as a regulatory framework has to be set up in every country in order to ensure Universal Service, as required by European Regulation.The present model considers entry in a market with vertical differentiation and a geographical dimension where the incumbent firm is required to meet the Universal Service Obligation (USO). That is the obligation to provide a minimum standard, to cover the entire geographic area and to set a uniform, non-discriminatory price. In equilibrium the entrant will offer a higher quality than the incumbent and it will limit its geographical coverage to low-cost areas such as densely populated areas. The limited geographical entry prevents tough price competition, but the incumbent will raise its quality. Thus, the incumbent's customers enjoy higher quality and the entrants' customers receive even higher quality. While consumers benefit the entrant replicates the distribution network. Considering these costs the welfare effect is ambiguous.The experience from already liberalized markets, e.g. Germany, and the model results imply that one can expect a quality increase by the incumbent and an even higher level of service by the entrants. This effect may be realized prior to the effective liberalization date if the incumbent anticipates entry. Since market entry entails only limited specific investments, anticipated entry or potential competition should force the incumbent to raise its quality. Further, the prospect of higher quality may justify the cost borne by the entrants in replicating the distribution network. Zusammenfassung AbstractIn the advent of postal market liberalization in several European countries we expect that the incumbent operators anticipate entry by competitors who are not required to offer universal service, i.e. coverage of the entire country and uniform pricing. The market for postal service exhibits stronger network effects than in telecommunications because of limited interconnection. In the present paper we model entrants which can opt for a partial geographical coverage and who enter with a higher service quality than the incumbent. T...

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Competition over More Than One Prize

Cited by 125 publications

References 21 publications

Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations

Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations

Distributional Comparative Statics with Heterogeneous Agents

Liberalization of the Postal Service Market in Europe: Entry with Universal Service and Partial Coverage

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