Competition Policy and Productivity Growth: An Empirical Assessment

Buccirossi, Paolo; Ciari, Lorenzo; Duso, Tomaso; Spagnolo, Giancarlo; Vitale, Cristiana

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1487489

Cited by 117 publications

(129 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Finally, [6] and [7] are market equilibrium identities. To test Hypothesis 3, equations [3] to [5] are re-specified with lagged P EN to see if output price, profit, and capacity are influenced by the FCO penalty the year before.…”

Section: [3]mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Amazingly the investigation revealed that the cartel had existed since 1901 (see FCO Press Release 1997). 6 Our dataset spans 1958-1990 when cartels were per se illegal in Germany. During this period, industry and FCO reports provide a comprehensive view of the cable cartel.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They find a positive and significant effect of competition policy. 6 See also Eißfeldt (1928) and Saffran (1928). The cable cartel is probably one of the longest lasting cartels known.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Effects of different cartel policies: evidence from the German power-cable industry

Normann¹,

Tan²

2013

Industrial and Corporate Change

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the authors' own opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of the editor. Terms of use: Documents in Effects of Different Cartel Policies:Evidence from the German Power-Cable Industry * Hans AbstractWe analyze the effects of cartel policies on firm behavior using data from the German powercable cartel. Antitrust authorities affected the cartel under two different legal regimes: penalizing the cartel in some years, and exempting it for ten years from the general cartel prohibition.While penalties did not reduce prices or profits, making collusion legal raised profits by at least 16% each year, compared to the time when the illegal cartel was not prosecuted. The threat of penalties was sufficient to reduce profit from collusion. The intended efficiency gains from rationalization, which was the justification for legalizing the cartel, did not materialize. * We are grateful to a referee for detailed and helpful comments. We are also indebted to John Connor, seminar

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Section: [3]mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Effects of different cartel policies: evidence from the German power-cable industry

Normann¹,

Tan²

2013

Industrial and Corporate Change

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“…(2006c), andSchinkel andTuinstra (2006). 15 See also Buccirossi et al (2009b). 16 There are of course other determinants of deterrence that do not fall among the categories discussed above.…”

Section: What Makes Competition Policy Work?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Measuring the Deterrence Properties of Competition Policy: The Competition Policy Indexes

Buccirossi¹,

Ciari²,

Duso³

et al. 2011

Journal of Competition Law and Economics

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The aim of this paper is to describe in detail a set of newly developed indicators of the quality of competition policy, Competition Policy Indexes, or CPIs. The CPIs measure the deterrence properties of a competition policy in a jurisdiction, where for competition policy we mean the antitrust legislation, including the merger control provisions, and its enforcement. The CPIs incorporate data on how the key features of a competition policy regime score against a benchmark of generally-agreed best practices and summarise them so as to allow crosscountry and cross-time comparisons. The CPIs have been calculated for a sample of 13 OECD jurisdictions over the period [1995][1996][1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002][2003][2004][2005]. Keywords: Competition Policy, Indicator, Deterrence, Competition Law JEL Classification: K21, K42, L40* This paper is based on a research project we undertook for the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission, with the support of the Directorate General for Competition. We would like to thank Fabienne Ilzkovitz, Roderick Meiklejohn, Adriaan Dierx and Francesco Montaruli for their comments and support during the project. We are indebted to Klaus Gugler, Giovanni Mastrobuoni, Damien Neven, Lars-Hendrik Röller, and Salmai Qari for useful discussions and suggestions. We are also grateful to participants at the WZB Conference on "Deterrence in Competition Policy", the ACLE conference on "To Enforce and Comply", and seminar participants at the DIW Berlin for their comments. Gianmarco Calanchi, Bas Dessens, Cecilia Nardini, Claudia Pollio, Constanze Quade and Simone Spalletta provided excellent research assistance in the building of the database. Tomaso Duso gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. iv ZUSAMMENFASSUNG Measuring the deterrence properties of competition policy: the Competition Policy IndexesZiel dieses Beitrag ist die umfassende Beschreibung von neu entwickelten Indikatoren über die Qualität von wettbewerbspolitischen Systemen: die so genannten "Competition Policy Indexes" (CPIs). Die CPIs messen die Abschreckungsmerkmale der Wettbewerbspolitik in einem Staat oder, genauer gesagt, in einer Gebietskörperschaft. Unter Wettbewerbspolitik ist hierbei sowohl das Kartellrecht als auch seine Vollstreckung definiert, wobei auch die Fusionskontrolle einbezogen ist. Die CPIs bauen auf "harten" Daten über die zentralen Merkmale eines wettbewerbspolitischen Regimes auf. Diese werden mit Orientierungswerten verglichen, welche anhand von in der Literatur und Praxis allgemein bewährten Verfahren definiert sind. Schließlich werden sie in Indikatoren zusammengefasst, welche einen internationalen Vergleich über die Zeit erlauben. Diese Indikatoren wurden für eine Stichprobe von 13 OECD Gebietskörperschaften (12 OECD Länder und die Europäische Union) für die Zeitspanne 1995-2005 berechnet. 2 IntroductionThe aim of this paper is to introduce the Competition Policy Indexes, from hereon "CPIs", a novel set of indicators ...

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“…Além disso, os estudos feitos nessa área normalmente focam no efeito de variáveis específicas sobre a produtividade. Os autores citam os trabalhos de Benhabib e Spiegel (1994), Benhabib e Spiegel (2005) Buccirossi et al (2013) analisam o efeito de políticas pró-competição no mercado de bens e serviços sobre o crescimento da produtividade, utilizando uma amostra de 22 indústrias em 12 países da OCDE. Os autores constroem 5 indicadores para mensurar a efetividade das políticas pró-competição nos diferentes países, e concluem que existe uma relação positiva e significante entre essas políticas e o crescimento da PTF.…”

Section: Revisão De Literaturaunclassified

Determinantes da produtividade: análise do impacto do índice GCI e seus componentes sobre a PTF

Sasseron¹,

Nakabashi

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Competition Policy and Productivity Growth: An Empirical Assessment

Cited by 117 publications

References 27 publications

Effects of different cartel policies: evidence from the German power-cable industry

Effects of different cartel policies: evidence from the German power-cable industry

Measuring the Deterrence Properties of Competition Policy: The Competition Policy Indexes

Determinantes da produtividade: análise do impacto do índice GCI e seus componentes sobre a PTF

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