Competitive channels coordination in a closed-loop supply chain based on energy-saving effort and cost-tariff contract

Hosseini‐Motlagh, Seyyed‐Mahdi; Johari, Maryam; Ebrahimi, Samira; Rogetzer, Patricia

doi:10.1016/j.cie.2020.106763

Cited by 36 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 63 publications

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“…Yang et al [30] considered the food supply chain and believed that the level of quality effort is very important for food safety and has positive externalities. For service quality efforts in the field of carbon emission reduction, Hosseini-Motlagh et al [31] researched competitive channels coordination in a closed-loop supply chain based on energy-saving effort and cost-tariff contract. Hosseini-Motlagh et al [32] indicated that coordinating the manufacturer's green quality and competing retailers' warranty periods increase the economic profitability of all supply chain members.…”

Section: Service Quality Effortmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quality Effort Strategy of O2O Takeout Service Supply Chain under Three Operation Modes

2022

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This paper investigates channel selection and quality effort in O2O takeout service supply chain consisting of a takeout platform, a catering business, and a distribution rider. By analyzing the three operation modes of platform distribution, business self-distribution, and business self-built platform + distribution, the profit functions of O2O takeout service supply chain members are constructed, respectively. On the basis of game theory, the optimal quality effort and profits are obtained. Combined with numerical simulation, the effects of revenue sharing rate and market size on the optimal quality effort and profits under different scenarios are discussed. The results reveal that O2O takeout platform should cooperate with more catering businesses, and adopt appropriate strategies considering different market sizes of catering businesses. Additionally, the catering business should properly consider the market size and adopt different online and offline prices. Meanwhile, the rider should choose a reasonable quality effort according to the revenue sharing rate.

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Section: Service Quality Effortmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quality Effort Strategy of O2O Takeout Service Supply Chain under Three Operation Modes

2022

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“…We ignored the effect of cost-sharing agreement between the manufacturer and retailer at the vertical level or between two manufacturers at a horizontal level. erefore, one can study the effect of contract mechanisms such as costsharing contract, trade-credit policy, cost-tariff contract [66], and revenue-sharing at vertical level or bargaining contract mechanism horizontal level. Next, in the proposed supply chain strategic structure, one can introduce market uncertainty or limits on government expenditure to assess how it might affect product green quality levels [68,69].…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effect of Optimal Subsidy Rate and Strategic Behaviour of Supply Chain Members under Competition on Green Product Retailing

Saha

Nielsen

Sana

2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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This paper investigates the impact of the subsidy and horizontal strategic cooperation on a green supply chain where two competing manufacturers distribute substitutable green products through exclusive retailers. Models are formulated in three-stage game structures in five different scenarios, where the government organization determines optimal subsidy by pursuing social welfare maximization. Both manufacturers invest in improving green quality levels of products. The study aims to explore the advantage of vertical integration and strategic collusion from the perspective of green supply chain practice in the presence of subsidy. The key contributions from the present study indicate that under competition, members of both supply chains are able to receive higher profits through horizontal collusion, but green quality levels of the product remain suboptimal. If upstream manufacturers cooperate, government subsidy does not necessarily improve product quality level, and the amount of government expenditure increased substantially. By comparing outcomes where members are vertically integrated with scenarios where members make strategic collusion, we found that the former might outperform by later. Cross-price sensitivity appears as a significant parameter affecting supply chain members’ performance and the amount of government expenditure. Cooperation between members at the horizontal level is a more robust strategic measure than vertical integration if consumers are highly price-sensitive.

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“…[2]. Considering the reverse logistics of supply chains, Hosseini-Motlagh et al [12] studied the impact of a manufacturer's energy-saving effort and re-manufacturing on environmental sustainability, as well as the optimal decisions of two competing retailers. In addition, the conservation of resources, reduction of waste, and minimization of energy consumption are the main objectives of the green supply chain at present.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…i [12,31]. Therefore, the profit functions of the involved players under cooperative promotion are as follows:…”

Section: Demand and Profit Functionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Green Supply Chain Management with Cooperative Promotion

2021

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Green supply chain management has received increasing attention as consumers have become more environmentally conscious. Manufacturers are making green investments to meet consumers’ demands, while retailers in different markets often engage in cooperative promotion to attract more consumers. This study develops game theoretic models for investigating cooperative promotion for two cross-market firms with different channel structures, i.e., decentralized and centralized. The manufacturer determines the wholesale price for the retailers and the green investment of a product, and the retailers determine the promotional effort and retail price. This study finds that whether the firms join in cooperative promotion mainly depends on the wholesale price, as well as the impacts of the price, green investment, and cooperative promotional activities on the demand. When the wholesale price is relatively low, the retail price of the decentralized green supply chain must be lower than that of the centralized green supply chain. On the contrary, the difference in the retail price between the two green supply chains varies with the impacts of green investment and cooperative promotional activities on demand. In addition, due to the influence of channel structure, the contribution to cooperative promotion of the centralized supply chain is more than that of the decentralized supply chain with the most given conditions. Moreover, as the impact of cooperative promotional activities on demand increases, the centralized green supply chain does not necessarily result in higher profits than the decentralized green supply chain.

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Competitive channels coordination in a closed-loop supply chain based on energy-saving effort and cost-tariff contract

Cited by 36 publications

References 63 publications

Quality Effort Strategy of O2O Takeout Service Supply Chain under Three Operation Modes

Quality Effort Strategy of O2O Takeout Service Supply Chain under Three Operation Modes

Effect of Optimal Subsidy Rate and Strategic Behaviour of Supply Chain Members under Competition on Green Product Retailing

Green Supply Chain Management with Cooperative Promotion

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